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CREDITORS' PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES: EXPANDING
STRICTURES ON TRADITIONAL RIGHTS
WINTON E. WILLIAMS*

The law of debtor and creditor, for so long so largely impervious to
change,' has become in recent years the subject of intensive reexamination in
the light of pressing social and economic issues. This interest, engendered as
a facet of the over-all plight of the consumer with its resulting societal malaise,
has provided the impetus for profuse legislative proposals and, sometimes
quite independent thereof, decisional law imposing restrictions on some timehonored devices of creditors.
The purpose of this article is threefold: to examine the traditional circumcriptions placed on the more common creditors' provisional remedies in
order to evaluate in historical perspective the ambit and function of these
remedies in modern debtor-creditor relationships; to analyze the recent case
law and other proscriptions evoking additional limitations, particularly constitutional ones, on these remedies; and to assess significant trends in the
continuing evolution of the law in this area with some consideration and
conjecture as to their socio-economic implications. In the labyrinth of creditor
and debtor law, illumination of concepts may sometimes best be achieved by
focusing on the laws of one state, particularly in those instances where there
are substantial differences as well as subtle nuances among the rules of the
various jurisdictions. This is especially true in examining the conventional
grounds for the provisional remedies for although influenced by a common
origin, development on a state-by-state basis, has not been marked by considerable uniformity. Prepared for this medium, this study resorts to frequent
excursions into the laws of Florida; nevertheless, many of the observations
made may have more general applicability.
PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT

The TraditionalAmbit
Prejudgment garnishment and attachment have historically been deemed
extraordinary remedies2 and, indeed, they offer unique benefits to the successfully invoking creditor. By removal of certain of the debtor's assets from
his control, the creditor obtains a measure of immediate protection against
a diminution in value either by design or neglect of the property that will
provide a means, perhaps the only means, of partially or fully satisfying his
claim once it is reduced to judgment. Subject to certain exceptions, the rule

in Florida is that personal property subjected to attachment by levy "shall
remain in custody of the officer who attached it until disposed of according
0B.B.A. 1957, Tulane University: LL.B. 1962, University of Mississippi; Assistant Professor
of Law, University of Florida.
1. See, e.g., J. MOORE & W. PHILLIPS, DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS pt. 1, §1, at
3 (3d ed. 1966).
2. E.g., F.A. Haber & Co. v. Nassits, 12 Fla. 589, 609 (1868).
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to law. 3 . . ." Similarly, although the property or debt garnished may not be
brought directly into custodia legis, garnishment also gives solace to the
creditor by making provision for the personal liability of the garnishee "for
all debts due by him to defendant, and for any tangible or intangible personal
property of defendant in his possession or control at the time of the service of
4
the writ or at any time between the service and the time of his answer."
Not only is security obtained against the voluntary acts or omissions of
the debtor but the lien status afforded the creditor's claim by the levy of the
writ of attachment, 5 provides the attaching creditor with all important priority
status in contests with third parties whose interests attached subsequently by
either voluntary or involuntary means.6 Although the judicial lien acquired by
attachment is often characterized as an inchoate one until judicial approval
of plaintiff's claim is forthcoming, it provides the attaching creditor seniority
against the subsequent execution lien of a judgment creditor of the debtor
even though the execution lien was obtained prior to judgment in the attachment suit. The determinative point is that the attachment lien preceded the
execution lien, and so long as judgment was subsequently obtained upon the
plaintiff-in-attachment's claim it is of no moment that the attachment lien
was an inchoate one at the inception of the execution lien.7 Thus, without
the agreement of the debtor, required for a consensual lien, and even prior
to a judicial determination of the merits of his claim, required for judgment
and execution liens, the creditor invoking attachment process acquires the
right to satisfaction of his claim from specific property of the debtor good not
only against the debtor but third parties as well and, therefore, the favorable
transformation of his status from general to lien creditor.
Early lien acquisition is advantageous in the attaching creditor's contests
not only against other individual creditors but representatives of creditors
in collective actions as well. When a levy of attachment precedes a valid
assignment for the benefit of creditors, the rights of the attaching creditor
in the goods levied upon are superior to those of the assignee for the benefit
of creditors.8 Moreover, unique powers of the bankruptcy trustee serve to
emphasize the urgency of early lien acquisition in priority contests. For example, the trustee in bankruptcy may not only prevail over any interest that
a creditor who obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings upon the
date of bankruptcy could prevail by virtue of his status as such creditor under
section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act,9 but also, if the respective requisites are
met, the trustee may excise attachment or other liens obtained within four

3.
4.

FLA. STAT. §76.22 (1971).
FLA. STAT. §77.06 (l) (1971).
FLA. STAT. §76.14 (1971). There is doubt as to whether garnishment creates a lien in

5.
Florida. See authorities collected in 3 Ft. Jup. Attachment and Garnishment §128 (1955).
6. FILA. STAT. §76.15 (1971); see, e.g., McClellan v. Solomon, 23 Fla. 437, 2 So. 825 (1887).
7. See Zinn v. Dzialynski, 14 Fla. 187 (1872).
8. H.B. Claflin Co. v. Harrison, 44 Fla. 218, 31 So. 818 (1902).
9. 11 U.S.C. §110(c) (1970).
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months of bankruptcy as preferential transfers under section 6010 or as liens
obtained through legal or equitable proceedings under section 67a. 11
No compendium of the value of attachment and garnishment to creditors
would be complete without noting their use in producing quasi in rem
jurisdiction. 1 2 In this function the before-judgment procedures produce both
the security for the satisfaction of a forthcoming judgment and the very basis
for obtaining that judgment. Of course, the use of the writs will often induce
the general appearance of a defendant not amenable to personal service of
process within the jurisdiction, so attachment and garnishment may also aid
the plaintiff in obtaining in personam jurisdiction.
One other function of the writs is worthy of note. A common provision of
the garnishment statutes, and one contained in the Florida procedure, provides for a discovery function of garnishment process. 13 The garnishee is required to include in his answer whether he knows any other person indebted
to the defendant or having any of the property of the defendant in his
4

possession or control.1

As both the uses and limitations of the writs are a product of their history,
it seems appropriate to give some study to their origin and early development.
Whatever stigmas its detractors may now ascribe to prejudgment garnishment
and attachment, the early use of the process in England, both before and
after the abolishment of imprisonment for debt, compelled the appearance
of the defendant by the attachment of his property in lieu of his body, 15 and
must necessarily be characterized as relatively benign. The primordial institution from which stems the practice in this country was the custom of foreign
attachment of the City of London 1 6 whereby the creditor of an absent debtor
could attach the latter's goods in the possession of a third party, the garnishee,
or a debt owing his debtor by the garnishee to obtain judgment and satisfaction thereof from the debt or chattels attached.7 As the debtor was entitled
to terminate the attachment by special bail or surrender of his person, however, the London custom was directed more toward compelling the defendant's
appearance than toward providing a means of satisfying plaintiff's claim
should the suit result in a judgment against the defendant38 The significance
of the device as a means of compelling the appearance of the debtor lies in
the restrictions common law procedure placed on default judgments in other
than real actions in England until 1725.19
10. 11 U.S.C. §96 (1970).
11. 11 U.S.C. §107 (a) (1970). The partial overlap between §§60 and 67a avoiding powers
is discussed in 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §60.11 (3) (14th ed. 1969).
12, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
13. FLA. STAT. §77.04 (1971).
14. Id.
15. 1 R. SHINN, ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT §2 (1896).
16. C. DRAKE, Surrs BY ATTACHMENT §1 (4th ed. 1873).
17. S. RJ.SENFLD, CASES
TION 177 (1967).

AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORs'

18. R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT
87 (1952).
19. Id. at 361; S. RiEsENFELD, supra note 17, at 179.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

PRoTEc-

IN HSTORICAL PERSPECTrE

486-

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1972], Art. 3
1972]

CREDITORS' PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES

The American colonies nurtured the development of the process at an
early date20 and extended it to encompass not only the debtor's property in
the possession of third persons, but also in the New England colonies the
prejudgment seizure of tangible personalty in the defendant's own possession
and ultimately real property when it became liable to execution for debt.
Further expansion in the New England jurisdictions made the process
available not only against non-resident and absconding debtors but all
defendants in common law actions for the recovery of money. Of particular
significance in the New England development of these provisional remedies
was their eventual emergence as a collection remedy or judicially imposed
security device whereby the attached property was not released upon the
appearance of the defendant but would stand charged with any judgment that
might be rendered against him.21 In this function, therefore, creditors found
a very real protection against dissipation of assets pending litigation. Those
inroads on the restrictions contained in the primordial process embodying
direct attachment of the property in the debtor's possession as well as the
continued availability of the property for satisfaction of any judgment obtained have found common acceptance in the jurisdictions of this country
outside of New England. However, the other jurisdictions have generally
limited both direct attachment and garnishment of property or credits in the
hands of third parties to special grounds rejecting the reasoning that these
22
extraordinary remedies should be available against all debtors generally.
Considerable variation exists among the jurisdictions imposing special
grounds on the use of these provisional writs. With regard to the dangers
inherent in generalization, however, three broad grounds are commonly found:
(1) the nonresidency, absence or concealment of the defendant, which defeats
efforts at personal service of process; (2) the threatened or actual secretion,
removal or disposition of the defendant's property to make it unavailable for
creditors; (3) the conferring of the right based on the special nature of the
plaintiff's underlying daim.2 3 Although garnishment, known generally in New
England as "trustee process," and attachment have experienced a comple24
mentary growth in this country, in some jurisdictions two separate writs exist.
anomalously has assigned less stringent
Florida is within this group and 25
grounds to the writ of garnishment.

20. If we may ascribe some degree of credence to one commentator's enumeration of
those factors that made the provisional writs popular with American creditors in colonial
times, they are present a fortiori today. The multiple jurisdictions of this country coupled
with the unrestrained privilege of transit, an economy that utilized extensive credit and
laws that were for their time debtor-oriented such as the abolishment of imprisonment for
debt in colonial days contributed then as now to their utility function and, therefore,
popularity with creditors. See C. Dn.Ri,, supra note 16, §3.
21. R. MILAR, supra note 18, at 485-88.
22. R. MI.LAR, supra note 18, at 489.
28. V. COUNTRYMAN, CAss AND MATRIALS ON DmoR AND CREDrroR 10 (1964).
24. J. Mooan & W. PHIL.ips, supra note 1, pt. 2, §1, at 16-17.
25. In light of their historical development, garnishment is more firmly grounded in
the custom of foreign attachment in London with its attendant restrictions on use to cases
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Historical considerations aside, in Florida "[e]very person who has sued
to recover a debt ...

against any person, natural or corporate, has a right to

a writ of garnishment, in the manner hereinafter provided, to subject any
debt due to defendant by a third person, and any tangible or intangible personal property of the defendant in the possession or control of a third person."

26

The Court has construed the antecedent of the phrase "to subject any

debt due to defendant by a third person" stating: "If there is anything contingent or to be done by a person before the liability of another becomes
fixed, there is not such an 'indebtedness due' as contemplated by the statute
to which a writ of garnishment can apply." 27 Furthermore, the debt that
forms the basis for the underlying claim of the plaintiff against the defendant
must be actually due 28 and apparently not contingent nor unliquidated.29
The still broad legislative grant is delimited further, however, by a prohibition against the issuance of the prejudgment writ in tort actions30 and by
the requirement that plaintiff's motion initiating the writ state "that movant
does not believe that defendant will have in his possession after execution

in which the defendant was a nonresident or absconding debtor than to direct attachment
of property in the possession of the debtor. The latter remedy having its origins in this
country in the New England procedure that was available against all debtors including
those amenable to personal service of process within the jurisdiction. The anomaly may
perhaps be partially explained on the basis that the Florida procedures were formulated
in the 19th century after the coalescence of the two historical antecedents in the older
jurisdictions of this nation, which obviated to some extent the earlier dichotomy. This
conjecture fails to offer any reason for the existence of two different grounds in Florida.
26. FLA. STAT. §77.01 (1971). This section and related ones also make provision for
garnishment in aid of execution, a subject not within the purview of this article.
27. West Fla. Grocery Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 226, 77 So. 209,
211 (1917); accord, Chaachou v. Kulhanjian, 104 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1958); Cobb v. Walker, 144
Fla. 600, 198 So. 324 (1940). One insurance company garnishee attempted to forestall any
indebtedness from arising under its liability policy that restricted recovery to the assured
for loss actually sustained and paid in money by him after actual trial. This did not prevent garnishment in aid of execution from lying although the post-judgment process, like
the provisional writ, requires that the garnishee's debt to the defendant be due. The
garnishee as insurer had defended the action, which resulted in judgment against its insured,
and the court relied on an earlier decision in which a term similar to the pertinent one
had been "interpreted" as applying only in case the insurer denied liability and refused to
defend. Of course, policy considerations embodying regulation of the insurance industry
were predominant in the holding. See Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 124 Fla.
725, 169 So. 617 (19M6. Other requisites to the insurer's liability to the defendant such as
the insured's failure to give notice may cause a writ of garnishment not to lie. See United
States v. United Bonding Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1970).
28. FLA. STAT. §77.031 (1) (1971).
29. See Ake v. Chancey, 152 Fla. 677, 13 So. 2d 6 (1943) (equitable garnishment not
applicable where the amount claimed was unliquidated, in dispute or uncertain); Cobb v.
Walker, 144 Fla. 600. 198 So. 324 (1940) (equitable garnishment requires that debt be due
absolutely and without contingency); Moss v. Sperry, 140 Fa. 801, 191 So. 531 (1939) (equitable attachment allowed as the legal remedy of garnishment lies only for a debt actually
due and not contingent); Williams v. T.R. Sweat & Co., 103 Fla. 461, 137 So. 698 (1931)
(writs of garnishment issued ancillary to suit in equity properly dissolved where inter alia
there was contingency as to amount due). See also authorities cited notes 39-43 infra.
80. FLA. STAT. §77.02 (1971).
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is issued, visible property in this state and in the county in which the action
is pending on which a levy can be made sufficient to satisfy plaintiff's claim."31
The belief of the movant must be supported by the facts known to him and
an effort on his part to ascertain the existence of relevant ones, or the writ,
although issued on the general allegation, will be subject to a motion to
dissolve.32
Florida's attachment statute will not reach debts owed nor personal property of the defendant held by third persons, that being, of course, the office
of the writ of garnishment. Attachment does apply, however, to personal and
real property of the debtors, the property subject to the writ being designated
as "goods and chattels, lands and tenements"33 and "shares of stock in any
corporation incorporated by the laws of this state."3 4 In further contrast with
garnishment, attachment does not issue after judgment but is solely a provisional remedy; levy made after judgment on the property otherwise within
its purview is the function of execution process.3 5
Statutory grounds for attachment in Florida, although in most respects
more circumscribed than those for garnishment, do recognize the use of the
remedy not only on a debt due but also when the plaintiff's claim
has not matured. When the debt is due, the creditor is given twelve separate

grounds for attachment. 6 All are encompassed, however, within slightly al-

*

tered ambits of the first two of the three bases previously cited for limiting
the use of the process. Subsections 4 through 8, 11, and 12 of the Florida
statute set forth in the footnote embrace not only the nonresidency or concealment of the defendant but also provide for a debtor "actually moving" or
"about to move himself out of the state" as well as a debtor "about to remove
himself" or "actually removing himself beyond the limits of the judicial
circuit in which he resides." Additional grounds for attachment on a matured
claim contained in the remaining subsections of section 76.04 may be summarized generally as actual or threatened removal, actual secretion and actual
or threatened fraudulent disposition of the debtor's property. It is the

I. FLA. STAT. §77.051 (1) (1971) also requires that the "motion (which shall not be
verified or negative defendant's exemptions) stat[e] ... that the garnishment is not sued
out to injure either defendant or garnishee ... "
32. Bertman v. Kurtell & Co., 205 So. 2d 685, 686 (8d D.CA. Fla. 1967).
ItA

STAT.

§76.01 (1971).

34. R.A.

STAT.

§76.02 (1971).

33.

35. The designation of property subject to execution may be broader in scope than that
available for attachment, however. Compare FLA. STAT. §56.061 (1971), with Ft& STAT.

§§76.01-.02 (1971).
36. T". STAT. §76.04 (1971) provides: "The creditor may have an attachment on a
debt actually due to him by his debtor, when the debtor: (1) Will fraudulently part with
his property before judgment can be obtained against him. (2) Is actually removing his
property out of the state. (3) Is about to remove his property out of the state. (4) Resides

out of the state. (5) Is actually moving himself out of the state. (6) Is about to move
himself out of the state. (7) Is absconding. (8) Is concealing himself. (9) Is secreting his
property. (10) Is fraudulently disposing of his property. (11) Is actually removing himself
beyond the limits of the judicial circuit in which he resides. (12) Is about to remove him-

self out of the limits of such judicial circuit,"
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debtor's acts in regard to his property that, likewise, provide the grounds for
attachment when the debt is not due, and the grounds when the claim is
unmatured are limited to actual removal, actual fraudulent secretion, and
37
actual frandulent disposition of that property.

Attachment, therefore, may lie on an unmatured claim and the existence
of the gTounds for attachment will accelerate the maturity of the debt to one
"falling due on a day before commencement of the action." 38 However, other
limitations, which stem from cases construing the legislative grant and were
encountered in the analysis of the grounds for garnishment, similarly restrict
attachment. An unliquidated claim is not a proper basis for attachment because
the use of the term "debt," with its common law connotations in denoting the
statutory basis for plaintiff's underlying action, includes only those claims "capable of being readily reduced to a certainty."3 9 This result will occur "if the
amount thereof is fixed, has been agreed upon, or is capable of ascertainment
by mathematical computation or operation of law."' 0 If an unliquidated claim
is included with liquidated ones the validity of the latter is not affected but
the former is subject to being struck on motion.41 If, however, no motion is
filed a waiver of the defendant's rights will occur.4 2 Moreover, the predecessor
of the current statute embodying the requirements for contents of the plaintiff's motion when the debt is not due was held to exclude the use of
attachment when the liability of the defendant upon the contract was still
contingent. The ruling is probably viable under the present act, which incorporates substantially similar language in the relevant provision.43 Although the attachment statutes contain no specific counterpart to the legislative proscription of prejudgment garnishment in tort actions, the same rationale attendant in the prohibition of attachment in the cases of unliquidated
and contingent claims would seem to apply with equal or even greater force
to its prohibition in actions sounding in tort.44
37. FLA. STAT. §76.05 (1971) states: "Any creditor may have an attachment on a debt
not due, when the debtor: (1) Is actually removing his property out of the state. (2) Is
fraudulently disposing of his property to avoid the payment of his debts. (8) Is fraudulently
secreting his property to avoid payment of his debts."
38.

Fr.A. STAT. §76.06 (1971).

39. Papadakos v. Spooner, 186 So. 2d 786, 789 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966) (reasonable
attorney's fee).
40. Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154, 157 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
41. Id. at 158.
42. Id. at 158.
43. Compare FLA. STAT. §76.10 (1971), which provides: "When the debt is not actually
due, the motion shall state the amount of the debt or demand; that it is actually an
existing debt .... ." (emphasis added), with the statute construed in Tanner & Delaney
Engine Co. v. Hall, 22 Fla. 391 (1886): "The purpose in [the statute] requiring the statement that the debt or demand is actually an existing debt or demand [even though not due]
is to exclude from, or rather to show clearly the intent not to include within the remedy
contracts upon which the liability of the defendant is still contingent." Id. at 395.
44. FLA. STAT. §§76.04-.05 (1971) (debts only). "It has been generally held that liquidated claims arise ex contractu rather than ex delicto." Robinson v. Loyola Foundation,
Inc., 236 So. 2d 154, 157 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (dictum). See 6 AM. Jut. 2d Attachment and
Garnishment §50 (1963); 3 FLA. JutR. Attachment and Garnishment §18 (1955).
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In addition to the general grounds for attachment on debts due and not
due, special grounds exist. One basis for the writ in Florida recognizes the
nature of plaintiff's underlying claim as entitled to special consideration and,
thus incorporates the third general grounds used in this country to allow the
process. In an obvious exception to the proscription of the use of the writs
generally for unliquidated, contingent, or tort claims, section 76.32 provides
for attachment against the vessel "[i]n all actions

. . .

to recover damages ...

resulting from negligence in the navigation, direction or management of any
ship or boat . . . within the territorial jurisdiction of the state." 45 Another

distinct basis for attachment in Florida is in aid of foreclosure of a.mortgage
on personal property when the statutory requisites are present.4 6 In this case,
although the grounds all relate to the creditor's reasonable belief that the
property will be diminished in value or physically unavailable to answer a
foreclosure judgment, they differ from those relating to property in the general
writs. The property that may be subjected to the writ and is the subject of
the ills set forth in the grounds for attachment in aid of foreclosure would
appear to be not the debtor's general property but the collateral upon which
foreclosure is sought.47 The secured creditor's right to take possession of his
collateral from his debtor upon default is examined subsequently at greater
length in the discussion of the writ of replevin, but it should be noted that
the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in this state has probably diminished the need, although not abrogated the grounds, for the use of attachment in liquidating upon default a personal property security interest.48
In delineating the bases for attachment further examination of the contents of pleadings required to commence the action should be made. Attachment on all grounds requires the filing of a motion, "which shall not be
verified or negative the attachment debtor's exemption,"49 but the contents of
the motion then vary based on whether the action is based on a debt due,50
not due,51 ,is in aid of foreclosure,52 or is for the attachment of a vessel under
the special grounds prescribed therefor. 53 The requirements as to contents of

45.

FLA. STAT.

§76.32(1) (1971).

46. FLA. STAT. §76.07 (1971) provides: "Any creditor who is commencing or has commenced an action to foreclose a mortgage on personal property may have an attachment
against the property, when he has reason to believe and does believe that: (1) The property
or part of it will be concealed or disposed of so that it will not be forthcoming to answer
a judgment on foreclosure. (2) The property or part of it will be removed beyond the
jurisdiction of the court. (3) The property or part of it is of a perishable character and
is being used and consumed by the mortgagor or other parties. (4) The property or part
of it has been disposed of without the consent of the party holding the mortgage, and
stating who has the property, if known and if not known, that he does not know who has it."
47. Compare FLA. STAT. §§76.07, .13-(2) (1971), with FLA. STAT. §§76.04-.05, .13 (1) (1971).
48. See text accompanying notes 217-228 infra.
49. FLA. SrAT. §§76.08, .32(3) (1971). A similar requirement obtains for garnishment.
See note 31 supra.

50. FLA. STAT. §76.09 (1971).
51. FLA. STAT. §76.10 (1971).
52. F"A STAT. §76.11 (1971).
58. FLA. STAT. §76.82(3) (1971).
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the motions add little to what may be expected in the light of the different
bases for the writs and the various grounds assigned,5 4 but it should be noted
that when the debt is not due in addition to the required motion "plaintiff
shall produce before the officer granting the attachment, satisfactory proof, by
affidavit (other than his own) or otherwise, of the existence of the special
ground."s5

In addition to statutory garnishment and attachment, Florida recognizes
remedies of somewhat similar import in suits cognizable in equity. Although
56
the attachment statutes previously examined are limited to actions "at law,"
the court has found that "equitable attachment" will lie in proper cases where
there is no adequate remedy at law.57 The statutes enumerating the grounds

for garnishment do not include a self-contained proscription limiting their
application to suits at law, but the court had held there is no provision for
use of the writ in equity under the general garnishment statutes as garnishment is considered to be a legal, as distinguished from an equitable proceeding, and provision is made for a parallel proceeding in equity, albeit of more
limited application. 8 The court was referring to the forerunner of Florida's
present provision for sequestration, which allows for securing the party commencing an action in chancery for any judgment he might obtain against a
nonresident or absent defendant out of the effects of that defendant in the
hands of, or a debt owing the absent defendant by a defendant within the
state. 59
Aside from the necessity of grounds for the writs in actions at law, a
common practical limitation on the use of attachment and garnishment is the
requirement that plaintiff must post a statutory bond usually in twice the
amount of his claim60 Florida statutes recognize this method of according
some degree of protection to the defendant against the dangers inherent in
prejudgment deprivation of his property and premise the issuance of the prejudgment writs in attachment and garnishment generally on the filing of
bond with surety "payable to defendant in at least double the debt demanded
conditioned to pay all costs and damages which defendant sustains in consequence of plaintiff's improperly suing out the [writs.]" 6 1 The bond require-

54. Reference has previously been made to the interpretation given part of the required contents of the motion prescribed when the debt is not due in excluding attachment of contingent debts. See note 43 supra.
55. FLA. STAT. §76.10 (1971).
56. FLA. STAT. §76.01 (1971).
57. Jansik v. Studstill & Holenbeck, Inc., 153 Fla. 870, 16 So. 2d 165 (1944); Moss v.
Sperry, 140 Fla. 301, 191 So. 531 (1939); see authorities cited note 29 supra.
58. Williams v. T.R. Sweat & Co., 103 Fla. 461, 137 So. 698 (1931).
59. FLA. STAT. §68.03 (1971).
60. V. COUNTRYMAN, supra note 23, at 43.
61. FLA. STAT. §§76.12 (attachment), 77.031(2) (garnishment) (1971). The former
statute also provides: "[T]he bond shall be made payable to the state for the use and
benefit of all parties interested .... ." when mortgaged personal property the subject of
the attachment by the mortgagee, has been allegedly disposed of without his consent and
he does not know the identity of the possessor. FLA. STAT. §76.12 (1971). When the attach-
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ments are a very real factor in plaintiff's consideration of the use of the
provisional remedies as the law of this jurisdiction has long been that the
attachment writ is improperly issued, thus an action for breach of the condition of the bond will lie when there is a judgment for the defendant on
the merits of the underlying claim or the grounds imposed as a prerequisite to
its issuance are nonexistent.6 2 When the attachment is dissolved for some
irregularity or for some technical reason only, recovery on the bond will not
be forthcoming, 63 and the defendant in garnishment has not stated a cause of
action on the garnishment bond when he alleges and proves that the garnishment writ was dissolved on dismissal of plaintiff's suit solely for want of prosecution. 4
The measure of damages for the wrongful attachment of chattels is the
value of their use for the period the defendant is deprived of possession
and any loss or injury to the chattels during that period.6 5 Damages based on
any profits that would have resulted from the use of the chattels are not
proper,66 although damages proximately resulting from attachment of defendant's land, which had an "interrupting effect" on his real estate development, were recoverable in suit on the bond.67 Garnishment of defendant's
bank deposit, which froze her account with the garnishee bank until after
that institution failed, resulted in damages in a suit on the plaintiffs bond in
the amount of the account plus interest less the dividends received if the
garnishment were improperly sued out.68 That the defendant in garnishment
might have averted the loss by giving bond with surety conditioned to pay any
judgment the plaintiff may have recovered and thus released the account from
the writ,69 does not alter the rule as such damages are not special ones but

are the natural and probable result of the garnishment. 7o Reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant and other expenses of the contest are a
proper element of damages in an action on the bond when those fees and
expenses are for services rendered in dissolving the attachment as opposed

to defending the claim to which the attachment is ancillary. The distinction
is obtained so that the fees and other expenses of litigation are recoverable

ment is based on the special grounds provided for the attachment of vessels, the "debt
demanded" language is necessarily altered to reflect the different basis for the claim, "the
amount of money in good faith demanded," and the bond requirement is waived when
the state is plaintiff. FLA. STAT. §76.32 (4) (1971).
62. Steen v. Ross, 22 Fla. 480 (1886).
63. Id. at 486.
64. American Sur. Co. v. Florida Natl Bank & Trust Co., 94 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1938).
65. Florida Transp. Co. v. Dixie Sightseeing Tours, Inc., 139 So. 2d 175 (8d D.C.A.
Fla. 1962).
66. Id.

67. Norman Babel Mortgage Co. v. Golden Heights Land Co., 117 So. 2d 205 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1960). Any difference in damage criteria may result from attachment of real
property not divesting the defendant of possession thereof. See text accompanying notes
165-167 infra.

68. American Surety Co. v. Florida Natl Bank &Trust Co., 94 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1938).
69. FLA. STAT. §77.24 (1971).
70. American Surety Co. v. Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 94 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1938).
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only when the defendant achieves dissolution of the writ in a proceeding
1
separate from the trial of the case on the merits.7
Although defendant's suit to recover damages on the attachment bond is
limited by the amount of that bond, z-, suit on the bond is not the defendant's
exclusive remedy. Florida recognizes a subsequent action against the plaintiff in garnishment or attachment for malicious prosecution of the original
action when the elements of that tort are present.7 3
Of perhaps greater significance in delimiting the use of attachment and
prejudgment garnishment are the exemption provisions of state law. This is
especially true in Florida in regard to remuneration for "personal labor or
services" where the legislature has long seen fit to totally exempt such compensation from court process when it is "due to any person who is the head
7'
of a family residing in this state." 4
In the case of Wolf v. Commander75 an equally divided Florida supreme
court affirmed the lower court's holding that the exemption applied not only
when the right to payment was for manual labor, but also to a debtor's salary
for "services requiring special skill and intellectual fitness and for the performance of executive and administrative duties." 76 The case has been
followed, 7 7 and it would appear that any judicially construed dichotomy
based on wages paid for manual labor and salary paid for other personal
services is tenuous at best and not supported by the facts of economic reality
when service performed by those commonly denoted as blue-collar workers are
often equally or more remunerative than those of their white-(today more
78
commonly bright-) collar counterpart.
Very few jurisdictions have general exemption statutes that totally remove
the debtor's compensation for personal labor or services from the legal process

71.

L. Bucki & Son Lumber Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 109 F. 393 (5th Cir. 1901),

aff'd, 189 U.S. 135 (1903); Bondy v. Royal Indemnity Co., 134 Fla. 776, 184 So. 241 (1938);
Gonzales v. De Funeak Havana Tobacco Co., 41 Fla. 471, 26 So. 1012 (1899); Ritter v.
Miami Marine Agency, Inc., 133 So. 2d 107 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961) (third-party claimant's
attorney's fees for dissolution); Norman Babel Mortgage Co. v. Golden Heights Land Co.,
117 So. 2d 205 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
72. Florida Transp. Co. v. Dixie Sightseeing Tours, Inc., 139 So. 2d 175 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1962).
73. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Heating & Refrigeration Co., 184 So. 2d 705 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1966); Strickland v. Commercial Loan, 158 So. 2d 814 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
74. FLA. STAT. §222.11 (1971). The exemption is extinguished, however, so that garnishment will lie "to enforce the orders of the court of this state for alimony, suit money, or
child support, or other orders in proceedings for dissolution, alimony, or child support.
FLA. STAT. §61.12 (1971); e.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 113 Fla. 361, 152 So. 200 (1934). Recent
cases, however, seem to interpret the exemption from the exemption narrowly. See Healey
v. Toolan, 227 So. 2d 55 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969) (contractual obligation to pay child support
not incorporated in foreign decree of divorce); Noyes v. Cooper, 216 So. 2d 799 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1968) (past due sums first reduced to judgment).
75. 137 Fla. 313, 188 So. 83 (1939).
76. Id. at 316, 188 So. at 84.
77. White v. Johnson, 59 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1952).
78. See id. at 538.
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of his creditors,79 and the supreme court of this state has'opined that the
argument made against the statute in judicial proceedings might be well
made "to the legislature for we are not prepared to say that it is wholly
devoid of merit."8 0 Indeed, it is reprehensible for a judgment debtor's annual
salary of 67,000 dollars to be wholly exempt from garnishment, especially
when he lives with his wife in a home worth 200,000 dollars; owns with
his wife a one-half interest in a $3.5 million motel; and, as a final embellishment drives a Cadillac automobile, all in terms of 1964 dollars and, we may
assume, current model Cadillacs, but such is the law of Florida.", The court
is correct in failing to distinguish between wages for manual labor and salary
or other compensation for personal services for such a posture "would result
in inequality as between citizens in the same income bracket."8' 2 Nevertheless,
such wholesale largess of justifiable creditor interests should be reexamined by
the appropriate branch of government, since the underlying purpose of the
exemption statute-to ameliorate the debtor's position by preserving to him
and his family a means of subsistence and economic viabilitys 3-can be accomplished by more circumspect action devoid of the inequities of the present
exemption law. No statute should sanction debtors' riches beyond the dreams
of avarice at the expense of and removed from the just claims of their creditors.
The position taken by Congress is illustrative of a finer balancing of the
respective rights of debtor, creditor, and society in its grant of a limited exemption tied to a percentage of the debtor's wages delimited by the imposition
of an additional and controlling standard affixed to the federal minimum wage
for the low-income wage earner.84 Of course, the partial federal exemption
need only be invoked by the debtor when state exemption law fails to
provide greater protection, but that position is reached in a Florida proceeding
when the debtor fails to meet the dual qualification of residency and head
of family.8 5 Thus, federal law now fills a void in the ambit of protection
afforded debtors by the state and the ordinary creditor is in any event limited
to "25 per centum" of his debtor's "disposable earnings... or ... the amount

by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the
Federal minimum hourly wage

. . .

in effect at the time the earnings are

payable, whichever is less."86

79. See B. CuRRAN, TRNs IN CONSUKMR CRExrr LEGISLATON 338-41 (1965).
80. White v. Johnson, 59 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1952).
81. See France v. Hart, 170 So. 2d 52 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). All of the enumerated
property was held by the judgment debtor as an estate by the entirety and was also not
available to answer for the judgment debts of one of the tenants individually. Id. at 53.
82. White v. Johnson, 59 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 1952).
83. See, e.g., Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 102 Fla. 603, 136 So. 353 (1931). Of course,
society and the state also benefit as the debtor and his family do not become public charges.
84. Consumer Credit Protection Act §§301-07, 15 U.S.C. §§1671-77 (Supp. V, 1970).
85. FLA. STAT. §222.11 (1971).
86. 15 U.S.C. §1673 (Supp. V, 1970). The statute removes from its restrictions on
maximum allowable garnishment "(1) any order of any court for the support of any person.
(2) Any order of any court of bankruptcy under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act. (3)
Any debt due for any state or Federal tax." Id.
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The proposed, and in a few states enacted, Uniform Consumer Credit Code
adopts the same formula for limiting garnishment of earnings "to enforce payment of a judgment arising from a consumer credit sale, consumer lease, or
consumer loan," but increases the exemption from thirty times the minimum
hourly wage to forty.8 7 Another proposed comprehensive piece of consumer
legislation, the National Consumer Act, completely exempts "unpaid earnings" from "levy, execution, sale and other similar process in satisfaction of
a judgment for an obligation arising from a consumer credit transaction." '8 , It
should be noted, however, that the exempt status accorded by the proposed
act has no application to the obligations of a business debtor, whereas present
Florida exemption legislation is not so limited. 9 The fault with the Florida
statute is not that it totally exempts income from personal labor or services
for debtors of moderate or lesser income, but that it also provides a haven
of total protection for those who could well afford and should be required
to pay their debts off the top of remuneration well in excess of that required
to sustain a current adequate standard of living. It should not be a formidable
task to draft a statute that would remove an adequate portion of the debtor's
wages from the reach of creditors taking into account in even generous measure the cost of living of the debtor and his dependents, but making any excess available for the payment of creditors.
Of course, Florida has other general exemptions delimiting the use of
attachment and garnishment. Constitutional status is accorded the exemption
for the homestead with no limitations as to monetary value and personal
property to the value of 1,000 dollars. 0 The language of the provision only
exempts the property "from forced sale under process of any court,"91 but it
has been construed to exempt funds due from a property insurer to an
insured that were the subject of a garnishment action even though the plaintiff, if successful in the action, could have applied the funds to his judgment
without the necessity of a "forced sale." 9 2 The court recognized an overriding
"beneficient purpose of the Constitution" requiring that construction. 93 Once
again, the failure to place any monetary limitation on the value of the homestead on occasion may result, as does the open-ended exemption for payment
for personal labor or services, in misplaced solicitude for the anything but
impecunious debtor,
Furthermore, Florida statutes exempt certain life insurance proceeds,9 4 the

87. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §5.105 (1970).
88. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr §5.106 (First Final
Draft 1970).
89. For the definition of "consumer credit transaction" see id. §1.301 (10).
90. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4.
91. Id. §4(a).
92. West Fla. Grocery Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 77 So. 209 (1918).
93. Id. at 229, 77 So. at 212. The Florida statute implementing the constitutional
provision by setting forth the method for exempting personal property speaks, inter alia,
to protection from "a writ of garnishment upon any . . . money or choses in action."
FLA. STAT. §222.06 (1971).
94. FLA. STAT. §222.13 (1971).
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cash surrender value of certain life. insurance policies, 95 wages due to a
deceased employee,9 6 and disability income benefits under certain policies
or contracts of insurance.9 7 In addition to the general provisions, however,
special state statutory exemptions exist such as that applicable to workmen's
compensation benefits, 98 and Congress has seen fit to remove from the reach
of creditors certain pension and retirement benefit funds. 99 Exemptions of
both state and federal law, general and special, contribute significantly then
to the multicircumscribed status of prejudgment garnishment and attachment.
A review of the mechanics of attachment and garnishment proceedings
once they are found to lie is beyond the scope of this study. However, there
is one rule of application that should be examined, as it diminishes the
effectiveness of the garnishment writ when it is directed against the employer
or any other continuous debtor of the defendant as garnishee. It has been
previously noted that in Florida the indebtedness due the defendant by the
garnishee must be other than contingent before it may be made the subject
of garnishment. 00 In this state the garnishee's liability on any one writ is
limited to his indebtedness due the defendant at the time of the service of
the writ or accruing between the date of that service and the time of his
answer, which must be served on the plaintiff within twenty days.10' This
rule then does not subject earnings made subsequent to the filing of the
answer to the garnishment process unless an additional writ is filed before
those wages are paid the employee. 102 The impediment thus placed on the
garnishment procedure is that successive writs will be required if the collection
process is to continue in those numerous cases where the amount accruing to
the plaintiff's benefit under the first writ is insufficient to satisfy his claim.
This procedure may impose unnecessary hardship and expense on all parties
to the action, and if adequate safeguards to the undesirable use of the garnishment writ are otherwise provided, there seems to be no good reason why the
writ should not be continuously binding on the defendant's wages until such
time as a sufficient amount is accrued to satisfy plaintiffs claim.
One other commonly contained provision in proceedings under the writs
of attachment and garnishment is the right of the defendant to obtain by the
giving of bond the return of the property in attachment cases' 03 and the dis.
SrAT. §222.14 (1971).

95.

FLA.

96.

FLA. STAT. §§222.15-.16 (1971).

97. FLA. SrAT. §222.18 (1971).
98. FLA. STAT. §440.22 (1971). Others cited by one commentator include "fraternal benefit
society payments, teacher retirement benefits [and] recoveries by persons injured that come
within the purview of the hazardous occupations act." LaGrone, Recovery of a Florida
Judgment by Garnishing Wages of the Head of a Family, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 196, 197
(1964) (footnotes omitted).
99. 5 U.S.C. §8346 (civil service retirement benefits); 38 U.S.C. §3101 (1970) (Veterans'
Administration benefits); 42 U.S.C. §407 (1970) (Social Security benefits); 45 U.S.C. §2281
(1970) (railroad pensions).

100. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
101. F" STAT. § §77.04, .06 (1971).
102. Chaachou v. Kulhanjian, 104 So. 2d 23 (a. 1958).
103. FLA. STAT. § §76.18, .19, .32(5) (1971). Professor Countryman observes two different
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charge of the writ and release of the property in garnishment cases. 10 4 This
right of the defendant has no appreciable effect on the advantages obtained
by a garnishing or attaching creditor, since a bond meeting the statutory
standards will generally provide a better and more convenient source of
collection to the creditor than the property originally subjected to the writ.
Conversely, by release of his property the defendant may obtain such benefits
as immediate freedom of enjoyment and possession and a restoration, at least
in some cases, of the power to alienate free of the encumbrance of the judicial
lien.105

Further containment of the garnishment process is encountered in the
general immunity accorded the state government except when the writ is to
enforce court orders for alimony, suit money, support, or other orders in
actions for divorce or alimony.06 Finally, all creditors must recognize the indeterminancy of the scope of the writs that results from the ever continuing
process of interpretation of existing statutes. An intermediate Florida appellate court has recently held that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Dade County did not have jurisdiction to issue writs of garnishment. 07 While an exhaustive listing of the limitations of provisional attachtypes of bonds, one of which is conditioned on defendant's payment of a judgment recovered against him while the other is conditioned only on the availability of the
attached property to the plaintiff should he recover judgment. The former releases the
lien on the property while the latter does not. See V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MARzAIS
ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR

13 (1964). Florida opts for a debtor's choice offering both types

of bonds in the provisions made for defendant's bond in attachment generally. FLA. STAT.
§§76.18-.19 (1971). The reason for the option may well be the desire to give the defendant
an immediate means of discharging the property from the lien even though this may
require a bond conditioned upon a greater obligation upon default of condition as would
be the case where the property attached is worth less than the claim, but plaintiff posts
bond conditioned on payment of the debt and costs in lieu of the forthcoming of the
property to abide the final order of the court. When the defendant posts bond to obtain
restoration of a vessel attached under the special provisions provided in the case of the
negligent operation thereof, the bond must be conditioned for the forthcoming of the
property to abide the judgment. FLA. STAT. §76.32(5) (1971).
104. FLA. STAT. §77.24 (1971). Here, the defendant's bond is "conditioned to pay any
judgment recovered against him in the action with interest and costs, or so much thereof
as shall equal the value [of the property subjected to garnishment]." Id. Nevertheless, the
bond is sufficient to release the property from a lien if one exists. "On the approval of the
bond the court shall discharge the garnishment and release the property." Id.
105. See notes 103, 104 supra.
106. FLA. STAT. §61.12 (1971); Ops. A-r'y GEN. FLA. 069-12 (1969).
107. State ex rel. Cosgrove v. Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, 252 So. 2d 597 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1971). The Third District found that process issued on "judgments" of the
Domestic Relations Court of Dade County arising out of the petitioner's duty toward some
member of his family failed to comply with statutory requirements for the post or prejudgment writ contained in Florida Statutes, §77.01. "It cannot, in our opinion, be said
that Vivian Duncan, as custodian of John, Sandra L. and Frank F. Cosgrove, Jr. sued to
recover a debt or recovered a judgment." Id. at 599. Furthermore, the appellate court
refused to find that the power to issue writs of garnishment was implicit in the act
creating the court of limited jurisdiction, such implication being negated by specific grants
of power to issue garnishment writs given by the legislature in the case of certain other
enumerated courts of limited jurisdiction. No express provision for a jury in the Domestic
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ment and garnishment may be indeed a quixotic quest, this writer takes solace
in.the hope that this work does raise and examine to some extent the principal
ones apposite to Florida practice.
The reader who has endured this necessarily technical analysis of the
confines of the attachment and garnishment writs will have noted that at
this point in the discussion those limitations are the result almost entirely
of state action. The work of Congress in providing exemptions has been the
sole direct exception to the picture of unfettered state regulation thus far
presented.
Florida has been prolific in modifying what initially appears to be a
broad grant of power to creditors. The legislation in its entirety, and especially when coupled with judicial interpretation thereof, has not produced a
panacea for the ills of creditors in the form of before-judgment garnishment
and attachment. This is not to say, however, that the Florida judicial and
legislative experience with the writs is aberrant. The unusual powers enjoyed
by a creditor in the exercise of these provisional remedies have historically
been a source of no small concern to courts, which no doubt has taken form in
the oft-stated maxim: "[A]ttachment, being in derogation of the common law,
courts are not inclined to extend its provisions beyond the requirements of
the statute authorizing it."108 Nor are the Florida statutes, with the exception of the unlimited exemption provisions previously noted, an uncommon
approach to the subject.
Although the regulation of the use of the writs had historically been a
function of the several states, the very caution of judges in policing their use
by strict constructions might well have forewarned, especially in recent years, of
the difficult testing against expanding constitutional standards that lay ahead.
Perhaps creditors took solace in the case of Ownbey v. Morgano9 where the
Supreme Court upheld a Delaware statute that not only preconditioned prejudgment release of property to the debtor upon posting of surety bond but
also harshly required a nonresident individual to enter the same security as
a condition to making appearance and defending the action. The proceeding
was held not violative of due process although the Court noted that the hardship occasioned by the facts of the case - the defendant had been unable to
raise bond with the attached stock as collateral because the corporation was
in receivership - had resulted in the Delaware Legislature amending the attachment statute. 10 This seeming immunity from constitutional incursions

Relations Court of Dade County vis-a-vis the provision for jury trial of issues contained
in the garnishment statutes also influenced the court. Id. The opinion while technically
sound is an example of judicial inclination to strict interpretation of garnishment statutes.
Here the result seems to work at cross-purposes to that policy favoring the collection of
alimony and support money exemplified by the previously noted removal of the debtor's
exemption for remuneration for personal labor or services and the removal of the immunity
of public bodies from garnishment proceedings in such cases. FLA. STAT. §61.12 (1971). In
accord with the decision is Awbrey v. Nevell, 260 So. 2d 281 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
108. Mitchell v. St. Maxent's Lessee, 71 U.S. 287, 243 (1866).
109. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
110. Id. at 107.
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was not to continue, however, and when a Wisconsin debtor decided to contest the validity of a state statute allowing prejudgment garnishment of a resident's wages, the stage was set for a new era in balancing the rights of debtor
and creditor in provisional remedies. The case has become a cause celebre, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp."'1
THE RAMIFICATIONS

oF SniadachAND

ITS PROGENY

In Sniadach the Wisconsin supreme court upheld the validity of the state's

provisional garnishment procedure against a number of constitutional attacks. 1 12 State statutes afforded the defendant no right to an immediate hearing
to challenge the validity of the garnishment as opposed to the merits of the
underlying claim but as Wisconsin case law established a right to such judicial review, no denial of due process was found to result.1" 3 A more comprehensive due process argument was found in defendant's contention that
deprivation of property without due process resulted from the immediate
loss of use of her wages stemming from the service of the summons on the

garnishee, a summary process that afforded the defendant no notice nor opportunity to be heard. This factor is, of course, basic to all provisional writs
and is indeed what distinguishes prejudgment garnishment and attachment
from garnishment in aid of execution and execution itself once a judgment
is obtained. The Wisconsin court was not without precedent for invalidating
this incursion into the realm of the prejudgment writs, however, and found
14
no reason for distinguishing the case from the rule in Ownbey.1
The garnishment before judgment proceedings do not involve any
final determination of the title to a defendant's property, but merely
preserve the status quo thereof pending determination of the principal
action. The defendant receives notice and 1 a5 hearing before being
permanently deprived of his or her property.

Although all the Supreme Court precedent relied on by the Wisconsin
court: the foreign attachment of corporate stock in Ownbey,16 the attachment
of real estate and share interest in a corporation of a defendant who
appeared specially to object to the jurisdiction of the court in McKay v.
Mclnnes," 7 and a Georgia proceeding that authorized the superintendent of
banks to issue an execution against the property of a stockholder of an insolvent bank upon whom a stock assessment had been levied in Coffin

Ill. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
112. Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967).
113. Id. at 174, 154 N.W.2d at 265. The Florida statute specifically provides: "The
Court to which garnishment is returnable shall always be open for hearing motions to
dissolve the garnishment." FLA. STAT. §77.07 (1) (1971). A similar provision is made for
attachment. FiA. STAT. §76.24 (1) (1971).
114. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
115. 37 Wis. 2d at 169, 154 N.W.2d at 262 (emphasis added).
116.

Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).

117. 279 U.S. 820 (1929), afJ'd per curiam, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928).
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Brothers & Co. v. Bennett"58 were not cases on all fours with the garnishment
of wages of a resident defendant in Sniadach, the Wisconsin court applied
the rule of these cases, validating prejudgment deprivation against contentions of unconstitutionality generally to provisional writs and thus to the
facts of the case at bar." 9
It is noteworthy that the decision of the Wisconsin court in Sniadach and
the precedent upon which it is based rest on the rationale that there is no
due process deprivation because the property subjected to the provisional
writs is in custodia legis or is, in no event, given over to the plaintiff in the
form of proceeds from execution sale until after a judicial determination of
the merits of the plaintiff's case has been made. In a strong dissent to the
Wisconsin court's disposition of Sniadach, Judge Hefferman attacked this
reasoning: "The constitutional question is not whether defendant has lost his
title to the property nor whether another has gained its beneficial use. The
test is whether he was deprived of his property."'120 In upholding prejudgment
attachment the Maine court, in its decision in McKay, recognized that deprivation "takes place when the free use and enjoyment of the thing or the
power to dispose of it at will is affected," but did not think that was "the
deprivation of property contemplated by the Constitution."'' 1 But does subsequent notice and a hearing prior to any permanent deprivation that might
result validate the temporary taking inherent in provisional attachment and
garnishment procedure in all the instances in which the laws of the various
states make these writs available? In the balancing of debtor and creditor
rights, are the interests of the latter as promulgated by the attachment and
garnishment laws of the various jurisdictions, necessarily preponderant in all
cases when subjected to the constitutional test of due process? The Supreme
Court in Sniadach categorically answered these questions in the negative.
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in Sniadach, first observed the
hiatus in the right to present enjoyment of wages caused by state action prior
to a hearing engendered by the judicial process embodied in the statutory
proceeding. His initial inroad on the constitutional scantity of the procedure
is couched, however, in terms of its invulnerability in certain cases. The
statement is nonetheless a very real encroachment on the traditional prejudgment process. "Such summary procedure may well meet the requirements
of due process in extraordinarysituations."122

The statement is followed by a citation to cases lending analogous support.

118. 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
119. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin further cited a West Virginia decision, Byrd v.
Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932), in support of its holding of no denial of due
process. In Byrd the court held there was no denial of due process in a prejudgment
garnishment of a non-resident defendant.
120. 37 Wis. 2d at 178-79, 154 N.W.2d at 267 (dissenting opinion).
121. 127 Me. at 116, 141 A. at 702. "And if it be, it is not a deprivation without 'due
process of law' for it is a part of a process, which during its proceeding gives notice and
opportunity for hearing and judgment of some judicial or other authorized tribunal." Id.
122. 395 US. at 339 (emphasis added).
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In addition to the cases of Ownbey v. Morgan1 23 and Coffin Brothers & Co. v.
Bennett,12 1 considered by the Wisconsin court, two further opinions are cited.
In Fahey v. Mallonee 2 5 the Court upheld a statute authorizing a taking of
possession of the assets of a building and loan association prior to notice
or hearing by a Federal Home Loan Administration conservator due to the
delicate nature of the institution and the impossibility of preserving credit
128
during an investigation. Ewing v. Mytinger 6 Casselberry, Inc. upheld a
provision of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act permitting multiple
seizures of misbranded articles prior to a hearing where the Administrator had
probable cause to believe that the misbranded article would be materially
misleading to the injury or damage of a purchaser. Having established a basis
- extraordinary situations - for the omission of prior notice and hearing
requirements and given illustrations thereof, the Court then distinguished the
2
instant case, removing it from the sanctioned perimeter. 7
But in the present case, no situation requiring special protection to a
state or creditor interest is presented by the facts; nor is the Wisconsin statute narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condition.
Petitioner was a resident of this Wisconsin community and in personam
jurisdiction was readily obtainable.
The court attempts no compendium of causes that would require special
protection to a state or creditor interest other than the cases cited presumably as illustrative, 28 but the opinion does bespeak two grounds for
distinguishing the garnishment in Sniadach from the area where extraordinary
situations are present. The first is the availability of in personam jurisdiction
or, more generally stated, the absence of a "situation requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest." The other factor is the type of property subjected to the writ, and this element is the subject of a great deal of
type of
examination in Sniadach. "We deal here with wages- a specialized
12 9
system."'
economic
our
in
problems
distinct
property presenting
A freezing of wages, when the process is combined with inadequate wage
exemptions not only deprives many wage earners of a primary or sole means
of support but, concomitantly, the creditor is able to exert undue leverage on
the debtor, who is all too often forced to take the most expedient means
available of releasing his wages from the writ even though the payment or

123. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
124. 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
125. 322 U.S. 245 (1947).
126. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
127. 395 U.S. at 339.
128. The Court specifically disposes of one other precedent relied upon by the
Wisconsin court in the following language: "A procedural rule that may satisfy due
process for attachments in general, see McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820, does not necssarily satisfy procedural due process in every case." 395 US. at 340.
129. 395 US. at 340.
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other form of settlement may be one of a justly disputed or even fraudulent
claim.130
Another attendant evil of wage garnishment recognized by the Court"31 is
the possibility of discharge from employment by employers who with some
just cause view the process as a source of annoyance and expense, if not also
casting doubt on the reliability of the employee. Congress has deemed this
practice of sufficient concern to legislate some protection in the area, and
now the employee is sheltered to the extent of garnishment for one indebtedness.132 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
would not limit the prohibition against discharge to any one or more garnishments, but the protection is limited to garnishment on judgments arising from
covered consumer transactions" 3s for the Act proposed by that body abolishes
prejudgment garnishment of unpaid earnings arising from a covered consumer
debt.134 The Act promulgated by the National Consumer Law Center likewise
prohibits prejudgment attachment of unpaid earnings arising from a consumer
credit transaction but furthers the proscription to cover any property of the
consumer."35 As previously noted, however, the latter statute totally exempts
unpaid earnings as well as certain other categories of the debtor's property
from process in satisfaction of a judgment for an obligation arising from a
consumer credit transaction,136 thus obviating any need for a prohibition
against discharge from employment precipitated by garnishment of wages.
An additional case against wage garnishment is contained in the rapid
growth of consumer bankruptcies. Threat to job security or direct loss of income necessary for support resulting from garnishment of wages has doubtlessly driven many consumers into bankruptcy when other viable alternatives
would otherwise have been present. One commentator has well documented
this argument by drawing upon available data to show a positive correlation
between the portion of a debtor's wages subjected to garnishment in the
various jurisdictions and the frequency of filings for bankrupty.137 Of course,
as is pointed out in that study, cause and effect relationship does not necessarily stem from correlation, 38 and as the ill may be remedied by provision
for adequate exemption and prohibition against discharge, it would appear
that a remedy embodying the absolute prohibition of wage garnishment would
not be dictated in this instance.

130. See the authorities presented by the Court. Id. at 34042.
131. Id. at 340.
132. "No employer may discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings
have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness." CONSUMER Camrr PRoTEC.
TION AcT §304(a), 15 U.S.C. §1674(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
133. UNIFORM CONSUMER CRErr CODE §5.106 (1970).

134. UNIFORM CONSUMER 0uDrr CODE §5.104 (1970).
135. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr §5.105 (First Final
Draft 1970).
136. Id. §5.106. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
137. Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53
CALI. L. REv. 1214, 1234-38 (1965).

138. Id. at 1235-36.
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It is apparent from the foregoing discussion, however, that in its application of the constitutional stricture to garnishment of wages, the Sniadach
Court selected an area where the process is all too often replete with adverse
social aspects. The according of stricter notice and hearing requirements when
the deprivation involves property essential to subsistence has found favor in
another recent opinion of the Supreme Court, Goldberg v. Kelly. 139 In that
case the Court held that a welfare recipient's benefits could not be terminated
without a prior evidentiary hearing. Gaining analogous support from Sniadach, the Court justified the dichotomy sometimes present in notice and
140
hearing standards thusly:'
Thus the crucial factor in this context - a factor not present in the
case of the blacklisted government contractor, the discharged government employee, the taxpayer denied a tax exemption, or virtually
anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended - is that
termination of aid pending resolution of controversy over eligibility
may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live
while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding
the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to
seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy.
Supreme Court recognition of the unique function of certain property is
further evidenced by Lines v. Frederick'4 1 where the property essential to
subsistence was once again wages, but a particular variety thereof, vacation
pay. The question was whether the employee's trustee in bankruptcy succeeded
to the bankrupt's accrued but unpaid vacation pay as of the date of bankruptcy, the trustee claiming the vacation pay under the comprehensive grant
given him as successor to the debtor's interests in clause 5 of section 70a of
the Bankruptcy Act.142 Holding that vacation pay was not property the title
to which vested in the trustee, the Lines Court distinguished Segal v. Rochelle143 in which loss-carryback tax refunds resulting from pre-bankruptcy
business losses not collected until the end of the calendar year in which bankruptcy occurred were found to be property passing to the trustee. The distinction is attributable solely to the "specialized type of property" in litigation in Lines, property that supports "the basic requirements of life" for
wage earners and their families "during brief vacation periods or in the
event of layoff.' 1 44 Considering the breadth of coverage of section 70a (5) of
the Bankruptcy Act,' 45 the decision is indeed significant in illustrating the
Court's increased concern for maintaining mimimal standards for the debtor
and his family.
139. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
140. Id. at 264 (footnotes omitted).

141. 400 U.s. 18 (1970).
142. 11 U.S.C. §110(a)(5) (1970).
143. 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
144. 400 U.S. at 20.
145. 11 U.S.C. §110(a)(5)
ed. 1969).

(1970); see 4A W. CoLImER, BANKRUPTCY §70.15 (1) (14th
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While the Court ruled unconstitutional as violative of due process the
prejudgment garnishment of wages of a resident defendant in the context
of Sniadach, it certainly does not follow that the Court foreclosed all further
use of prejudgment attachment and garnishment. The "extraordinary situations" test set forth as excusing prior notice and hearing would seem to be
a product of two factors-the immediate dependency of the debtor on the
uninterrupted use of the particular property and the countervailing interest
embodied in the necessity of the use of the provisional process to affect
legitimate public or creditor interests. In Sniadach, as there was no particular
impediment to the plaintiff's collection of an indebtedness of the resident defendant by ordinary judicial process not embodying the use of the provisional
writs in contradistinction to the case of a defendant not amenable to personal
service of process or the presence of other exigent circumstances and, as the
Court recognized that debtors are generally inordinately dependent upon the
use of the property garnished, the case provided a vehicle for a facile application of the test. Conversely, the greater dependency of the creditor on prejudgment process and the less the dependency of the debtor on the property
subjected, the greater the possibility that the Court will excuse notice and
hearing prior to a temporary deprivation of the debtor's property.
Examination of subsequent cases will establish that this rule is too
narrow a reading of Sniadach for some courts and too broad for others. As
a balancing rule it is also most difficult to apply to the myriad of cases that
may arise and, in the absence of more positive guidelines, lower courts have
not reached uniform results in the prejudgment garnishment and attachment
cases that have followed in the wake of Sniadach. An analysis of the
extent of the restrictions placed by the Supreme Court on the prejudgment
remedies by an examination of the following lower court cases must necessarily proceed on the basis of the then existing Supreme Court pronouncements. Only after these necessary steps in the evolution of the doctrine will it
be meaningful to consider the amplifications and modifications stemming

from the Supreme Court's second and latest direct holding in the realm of
constitutional strictures on prejudgment remedies, Fuentes v. Shevin.1 48
Causing the least difficulty but offering the least amplification of the
Supreme Court's initial restraint are those cases that parallel in both important aspects the narrow rule in Sniadach. When the property garnished
was wages and in personam jurisdiction of the defendant was apparently
obtainable in a context in which no other special creditor or state interest
was present, the absence of extraordinary situations uniformly has been
found. 47 So long as the freezing of wages occurred prior to hearing, attempts
to distinguish these cases from Sniadach on the grounds that the statutory

146. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

147. McMeans v. Schwartz, 380 F. Supp. 1397 (SD. Ala. 1971); Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 824 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz.
270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); McCallop v. Carberry, I Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr.
666 (1970); Cline v. Credit Bureau, I Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970).
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procedure was less harsh to the debtor in certain particulars than the Wisconsin process have been unsuccessful.48

When the property garnished is wages but the debtor is a nonresident and
apparently not amenable to personal service of process within the jurisdiction,
should the debtor's reliance on the property or the creditor's special need for
the process prevail? There is authority for the proposition that the debtor's
interest is paramount in the holding of an intermediate Delaware appellate
court.

49

The court disposed of any difference between foreign and domestic

garnishment by declaring it to be "irrelevant and immaterial" in a case in
which defendant's wages were frozen. 150 As the debtor will often be amenable
to in personam jurisdiction even if a nonresident of the forum state, due to his
presence at the garnishee's place of business within that state during working
hours, the necessity of quasi in rem jurisdiction may not be present in a large
number of cases. However, in the Delaware case it does not appear that the
defendant, a resident of Massachusetts, was brought within the state of
Delaware by his employment or otherwise and, in any event, the court gave
no consideration to the importance of the garnishment process as a means
by which a resident of Delaware may proceed against a nonresident defendant.
When quasi in rem jurisdiction provides the only means upon which a state
can afford its citizens redress against damages caused by nonresidents, it
would seem that the special creditor and state interest should not be lightly
dismissed.15 One federal court has concluded that the nonresidency of the
debtor is such an "unusual condition" as to excuse prior notice and hearing
152
even in the context of wage garnishment.
Must the special creditor interest that may arguably justify prejudgment
garnishment of even wages be limited to nonresidency? In Reeves v. Motor
Contract Co.'5 3 it was advanced that as plaintiff's ground for the writ was

that the defendant was "concealing himself," the situation contemplated
by the Georgia statute negated "the feasibility of having a prior hearing
on the merits. "154 The Court did not find that the argument pushed the boundaries of "extraordinary situations" beyond the nonresidency of the defendant,

148. McMeans v. Schwartz, 300 F. Supp. 1397, 1400 (S.D. Ala. 1971) (requirement of
an affidavit and the necessity of the bond); Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz.
270, 272, 463 P.2d 68, 70 (1969) (not necessary to embark on a detailed comparison of the
two garnishment procedures); McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 907, 464 P.2d 122, 124-25,
83 Cal. Rptr. 666,
(1970) (requirements that plaintiff file affidavit, that defendant
receive notice prior to issuance of writ, that plaintiff file an undertaking with sufficient
sureties and provision for automatic exemption in certain cases).
149. Mills v. Bartlett, 265 A.2d 39 (Del. Super. 1970).
150. Id. at 41. The court further noted that as Delaware's foreign attachment procedure failed to exempt any portion of the defendant's salary, the case was more offensive
than Sniadach. Id. State exemption laws are frequently limited to residents of the jurisdiction. V. COUNTRYMAN,

151.
P.2d 13,
152.
153.
154.

CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 21

(1964).

But see Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Super. Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 558, 488
28, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 723 (1971).
Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970) (three-judge court).
324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Id. at 1015.
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however, for it held that the reasoning "further exemplifies the logical inconsistency inherent within the statutory allowance of garnishment of
wages." 155 The Court concluded that, as under Georgia procedure, the
creditor must know the debtor's place of employment, he could not "simultaneously aver that the debtor has 'concealed himself.' ,,56 The reasoning
does point up the lack of real extraordinary situations that may be present
in many cases even in those jurisdictions that do limit garnishment of wages
or other property to special grounds. The argument does, however, overlook
the case where the debtor is not physically present at his employer's place of
business within the jurisdiction- doubtlessly not an uncommon occurrence
in this day of multi-state business enterprises.1 57 Certainly, due to the paucity
of cases upon which an authoritative rule may be formulated, the possibility
of garnishment of wages against a nonresident justifying a prejudgment
freezing of that asset should not be discounted. Similarly, the possibility
of extraordinary situations embodying other than nonresidency, such as the
debtor's commencement of the removal of his property from the jurisdiction
to put it beyond the reach of his creditors, may raise the type of creditor
interest deserving of protection and excusing prior hearing even in a garnishment of wages. The lower court cases do affirm the proposition, however, that
when the property subjected to the prejudgment writs is wages, the debtor
has a better foundation for erecting Sniadachianlls defenses than in other
cases.
When the property attached or garnished is other than wages, the debtor
has not met with the same degree of success in his constitutional attack on the
writs. Thus, foreign attachment of the defendant's checking account satisfied
due process requirements, 159 and it has been held that the constitutional prohibition is not evoked when the checking account and payments due on
completed contracts subjected to the writ were the property of defendants
who were apparently residents of the jurisdiction.160 Likewise, in an opinion
that thoughtfully traces the history of attachment and garnishment in the
155. Id.
156. Id.

157. In a dissent in Tucker v. Burton, 819 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970) (three-judge
court), Wright, J., observed that "availability to personal service and not mere nonresidency
is the touchstone in determining due process" in applying the rule of Sniadach. Id. at 580.

In First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Pomona Mach. Co., 107 Ariz. 286, 486 P.2d 184 (1971),
the court upheld the Arizona garnishment of the Arizona bank account of a California

business enterprise by a California creditor. While admittedly the garnishment may have
furnished the only basis for proceeding in Arizona, was Arizona chosen as the forum
simply to obtain the benefits of summary deprivation in a context in which there were
no special creditor interests deserving of protection?
158. The term is apparently coined by Judge Becker in a decision in Lebowitz v.

Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
159. Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 266 A.2d 904 (1969).
160. American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970).

"[Tjhe Supreme Court did nothing more than carve out an exception for wage earners from
what the Court deemed to be otherwise lawful prejudgment seizures, i.e., that garnishment
of wages was a limited exception to the general rule of legality of garnishment statutes."
id. at 152.
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light of Sniadach, Judge Becker felt constrained, in view of the language of
the Supreme Court opinion, "which at least recognizes the vitality of Ownbey
and McKay," to uphold the Pennsylvania foreign attachment law in a case
in which the bank account of the defendant foreign corporation had been
attached. 161 It is noteworthy that the defendant in that case, although a nonregistered foreign corporation, was amenable to personal service of process
through the state's long arm statutes. 16 2 The Arizona court has found that
impounding the reserve assets of a foreign business enterprise by garnishment
of its bank account in that state does not create the constitutional vice.8 3
Garnishment of defendants' obligors for other than wages and attachment of
the defendants' real property and items of personal property consisting of an
inventory of books, processing equipment, and office furnishings have successfully met the test of constitutional validity applied by a California inter64
mediate appellate court.1
Other due process attacks on attachment of real property have met with
no success. A federal district court has ruled that attachment of the defendant's
home under Connecticut procedure may be distinguished from the wages
garnished in Sniadach as "[t]he defendant is neither deprived of the use or
enjoyment of the property pending a trial on the merits nor is his livelihood
threatened by the deprivation of the right to freely transfer the realty."85
Florida is in accord. In refusing the application of Sniadach to a case in which
the non-resident defendant was not amenable to personal service of process
and constructive service was predicated upon attachment of real property, an
intermediate Florida appellate court held:166
We do not conceive that the rationale of the Sniadach case is applicable
to the attachment of property under the Florida statute here considered.
The attachment amounts to little more than constructive notice that a
suit for damages is pending against the owner and if judgment is
rendered in favor of the claimant the attached property might be subjected to levy and sale to satisfy the judgment. Such proceeding does
not create the evils nor result in the hardships which often follow the
garnishment of wages owed to a worker. We therefore conclude that
the Sniadach case is not authority for the proposition urged by appellants that the attachment statute involved herein is unconstitutional
and void.

161.

Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1353 (E.D. Pa. 1971).

"The thrust of the analysis contained in this opinion is directed to the theory that were
it to have Ownbey and McKay before it directly today, the United States Supreme Court
might well decide them differently." Id.
162. Id. at 1348-49.
163. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Pomona Mach. Co., 107 Ariz. 286, 486 P.2d
184 (1971).
164. Western Bd. of Adjusters, Inc. v. Covina Publishing, Inc., 9 Cal. App. 3d 659,
88 Cal. Rptr. 293 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970). But cf. Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Super.
Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971). See text accompanying note
174 infra.
165. Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Conn. 1971).
166. Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154, 159 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
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Certainly when attachment of land does not dispossess the debtor 67 there
is no interrupted use by the debtor and, therefore, no deprivation of property
prior to hearing except in the limited sense of imposing possible restraints
on freedom of alienation. Consequently, in the case of attachment of real
property, any legitimate state or creditor interest would seem sufficient to tip
the scales in favor of excusing prior notice and hearing requirements. The
reader may well conclude at this point that if Sniadach is limited to wages a position not unjustified by the authorities examined hitherto 6 ' - the doctrine is of little import in Florida, since the utility of wage garnishment is
greatly diminished due to the exemption provisions of the state in effect long
before the pronouncement in Sniadach. But the opinion of the Florida court,
if controlling, does not command such a narrow reading of the Supreme
Court's proscription and certainly no direct ruling was made as to the constitutionality of attachment or prejudgment garnishment of tangible or
intangible personalty other than wages. More importantly, however, Sniadach
is difficult to contain within the limited sector of contests to control rights
to wages.
A leading case extending the restrictions on prejudgment garnishment to
property other than wages is a subsequent holding of the same court that the
Supreme Court reversed in Sniadach. In Larson v. Fetherston169 the property
subjected to prejudgment garnishment consisted of the bank accounts of the
defendant corporation, a travel agency. While there is a difference in terms
of immediate social ramifications in the prejudgment seizure of the assets of
a commercial enterprise and the deprivation of a wage earner's means of
subsistence, certainly there is also a very real parallel in terms of economic
hardship to the debtors in the two cases. The loss of use of its most liquid
asset can result in the same hardships and application of undue leverage to
the business firm as the loss of use of wages produces in the case of the consumer defendant. 70 Additionally, there were apparently no creditor's interests
other than the understandable but ubiquitous desire of all creditors to safeguard against financial loss by prompt assurance of a means of collection presumably not an extraordinary situation envisaged by Sniadach. The
Wisconsin opinion does not lend itself to such a narrow holding, however.
The text of the opinion makes no direct reference to the absence of a special
creditor interest deserving of protection, and special consideration of the
type of property taken is indeed obviated:7'

167. Such is the case in Florida. Florida Ins. Exchange v. Adler, 174 So. 2d 75 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1965); FLA. STAT. §76.14 (1971).

168. In addition to the cases cited refusing to extend prior notice and hearing requirements to attachment and garnishment of property other than wages, many of the authorities
that have imposed the requirements on wage garnishment contain dicta limiting the rule
to seizure of wages only. See, e.g., Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011,
1016 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
169. 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).

170. If the debtor corporation were unable to meet its payroll as a result of the
garnishment, the parallel would appear to be complete even from a humanitarian standpoint.
171. 44 Wis. 2d at 718, 172 N.W.2d at 23 (1969).
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Although the majority opinion in Sniadach makes considerable reference
to the hardship of the unconsitutional procedure upon the wage earner,
we think that no valid distinction can be made between garnishment of
wages and that of other property. Clearly a due process violation should
not depend upon the type of property being subjected to the procedure.
Under the respondent's contention wages in the hands of the employer
would be exempt from prejudgment garnishment, but wages deposited
in a bank or other financial institution would be subject to prejudgment
garnishment.
Due to the absence in Larson of an analysis of the effect of a situation
requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest, one can only
speculate as to the general availability of prejudgment garnishment and attachment in Wisconsin. Doubtlessly, Larson produces at least a reweighting of
the scales more heavily in favor of the debtor's interest when the property
attached is other than an individual defendant's means of subsistence. To
this extent the Wisconsin court may well have practiced one-upmanship on
the court that had previously reversed it.
In the Minnesota case of Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Service, Inc.1' 2
there is an explicit recognition of the similarity between the garnishment
of the accounts receivable of a business firm and the wages of a worker, but
the Court expresses doubt as to whether Sniadach can be so narrowly read as
being restricted to only certain types of property. 173 Again, however, in the
facts before the Minnesota court there appear to be no extraordinary circumstances existing in favor of the creditor.
Judicial interpretations of the type of property protected by Sniadach
then have ranged from a limitation of the rule to one particular type of
property, wages, to a failure to recognize any restriction arising from the
property subjected to attachment or garnishment. As might well be expected,
however, there is a middle ground and that doctrine has been articulated by
the California court in Randone v. Appellate Department of Superior Court
74
of Sacramento County.1
The analogy between "wages" and "necessities of life" is sharply drawn
in Randone, the court observing: "extreme hardship arises not only from the
attachment of liquid assets such as wages or bank account proceeds, but
also from the summary seizure of such items of personal property as 'television sets, refrigerators, stoves and sewing machines, and furniture of all
kinds,' items that might loosely be described as 'necessities' in our modern
society.' 1 75 Some further indication of the breadth of coverage intended by

172. 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970).
173. "No rational distinction can be drawn between a livelihood dependent on wages
and one derived from the sale of services and goods if the rationale of the Sniadach case
is based on the policy of protecting a breadwinner from the harassment of creditors. If,
as we have indicated, that decision is premised on the broader constitutional concept
of notice and an opportunity to be heard, the rule should apply to the garnishment of
all property." Id at 210, 176 N.W.2d at 90-91.
174. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
175. Id. at 560, 488 P.2d at 29, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
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the term "necessities" is contained in the court's observation that their decision
gives practical effect to the protection afforded necessities by the California
exemption statutes - practical effect because apparently the California exemption statutes, as do those of other states, provide as to personal property
only for post-attachment operation, thus placing the burden on the debtor to
seek exemption and, in fact, in the interim incur some temporary deprivation.176
Doubtlessly to restrict Sniadach to wages alone is myopic in view of the
equal or perhaps even greater degree of hardship thrust upon the debtor by
the even temporary deprivation of various other property. The problem encountered is delimiting the type of property entitled to protection, if indeed
any limitations seem desirable. If Randone is read as equating the type of
property subject to special consideration under the rule of Sniadach to that
same property exempted by the constitution or statutes of the jurisdiction,
then some degree of certainty may be added to the law in this troubled area.
The problem encountered here, however, is that personal property exemptions
are not always stated in terms of specific property,177 and even when so stated
are often archaic statements of public policy.17 It seems perhaps more desirable to recognize the California court's ruling as doing nothing more than
reaffirming the statement of the extraordinary situations test previously made,
a test balancing the public's or creditor's special need for summary procedure
against the hardship of temporary deprivation to the debtor. The latter factor
would most certainly take into account the type of the debtor's property seized
and would recognize greater hardship from temporary deprivation of some
property than from other but it would in no way limit the protection afforded
debtors by Sniadach to wage garnishment alone. Support for this view, which
requires a consideration of all elements in the balancing of the rights of
debtor and creditor, is contained in the Randone court's characterization of
Sniadach as "not a rivulet of wage garnishment but part of the mainstream
of the past procedural due process decisions of the United States Supreme
1 79

Court."

If the Sniadachian "reevaluation of the potential and actual effect of prejudgment seizure upon debtors"''8 0 was but a part of traditional procedural due
process analysis, the product of decades of litigation, then there is authority
for reevaluating in the light of Sniadach not only the effect of summary
seizure on property other than wages by attachment or garnishment, but also
the seizure of property under any other remedy whereby the debtor is even
temporarily summarily deprived. Some evaluation then of other provisional
remedies that have been subjected to the scrutiny of Sniadach is necessary
to assess the effect of that landmark decision on all facets of debtor-creditor
law.
176. Id. at 562-63, 488 P.2d at 31, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
177. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, §4(2).
178. E.g., Mss. CoDE ANN. §307 (1966).
179. 5 Cal. 3d at 550, 488 P.2d at 22, 96 Cal. Rptr at 718; accord, Adams v. Egley,

338 F. Supp. 614, 618-19 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
180.

5 Cal. 3d at 551, 488 P.2d at 23, 96 Cal. Rptr, at 719.
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THE EXTENSIONS OF

Sniadach TO

OTHER SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS

Statutory Lien Proceedings
Not all liens arising by operation of law are the result of judicial action.
Arising quite separate and distinct from the custom of London, which evolved

into the modern judicial writs of attachment and garnishment, were the
rights at common law accorded the tradesman who furnished services on the
personal property of the debtor in his possession. 181
In any exchange when the performance of one party extends over a period
of time but the performance of the other party may be performed instantly,
one of the parties must necessarily give credit to the other. In the absence
of express agreement by the parties, contract law has long recognized that
the performance of the service by the tradesman was a constructive condition
precedent to the customer's duty to pay.' 8 2 The granting of a lien on the

chattels of his debtor to the party performing the service then might well
be justified on the basis of mitigating the rigors of a rule that did not imply
even a right to periodic payments as performance progressed.
During the nineteenth century many of the service liens recognized at
common law were reduced to statute but the legislatures of the various states
did more than codify earlier case law and in many instances created liens protecting new classes of laborers and suppliers while providing more effective
enforcement provisions for all service liens. 1 3 The mechanic's lien on real
property, a charge unknown to the common law, was a legislative product of
this period.18 4 Today most states have various acts protecting those service
industries that at some period of time were able to convince the legislature of
their importance to the local economy and need for protection. Although there
has been some conversion of the common law possessory lien into a nonpossessory one, often by resort to a filing system, most of the statutory service liens
on personal property are dependent, as were their common law antecedents,
on continuous possession by the lienor.1' 5
A fair sample of the variety of service liens recognized by statute is contained in the legislation of Florida, which provides for a mechanic's lien on
real property in favor of laborers and materialmen furnishing improvements;186 for liens on personal property in such general instances as the
performance of labor on and with machines, the performance of labor or
services upon the personal property of another, for labor in raising crops, for
manufacturing and repairing articles and for furnishing articles to be manu-

See B. MONTAGUE, LIEN 28-29 (1824).
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §270 (1932).
1 L. JONES, THE LAW OF LIENS 93 (3d ed. 1914).
L. BoxsoT, MECHANICS' IDENS 3 (1897). The first such statute was enacted in
Maryland in 1791 to encourage construction in the City of Washington. Id.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

2

G.

GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN

PERSONAL

PROPERTY

§33.2

(1965).

In

Florida,

possession is an important element not only in the continuation of the lien but also in
contests with third parties. See FLA. STAT. §713.74 (1971).
186. FLA. STAT. §§713.01-.36 (1971).
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factured; and for liens on personal property in such specific instances of
economic intercourse as the services of stallions, jackasses, or bulls in areas of
their common expertise and for board and lodging. 87 There is doubtlessly
some redundancy in the statutory scheme and the above list is illustrative
only, there being provision for many other groups in the legislative largess' 5 8
Service liens, today commonly referred to as "statutory liens" in recognition of their legislative adoption if not natural parentage, are an important
and unique device of creditors offering, if requisites are met, protection not
only against the debtor's voluntary acts diminishing the value of the property
but the competing claims of third parties as well. 8 9 Statutory liens are unique
because unlike attachment and garnishment liens they are not dependent for
their inception upon judicial action, and although they stem from a contractual relationship between the parties, they are not consensual liens as
there is no requirement of the parties manifesting intent to create a lien. 90
They are the creatures of statute and although consensual and judicial liens
are subject to and regulated by statute as well, both of the latter two are
dependent on something not required of the statutory lien -intent of the
parties to create a lien for the consensual lien and levy under a properly
issued writ for the judicial lien.
The statutory liens have one striking similarity to the provisional judicial
writs subjected to Sniadach, however, and that is that they provide for possession by the lienor, and thus deprivation of possession by the debtor, prior
to notice and opportunity for hearing.191 For this reason the statutory liens
did not long escape reappraisal in the light of Sniadach.
In Klim v. Jones 92 California's Innkeeper Lien Law had sanctioned the
extrajudicial padlocking of the non-paying boarder's room depriving him of all
his scant personal belongings including property used in his livelihood, his
painting tools. The hardships to the debtor and the lack of special circumstances requiring protection of a state or creditor interest dictated a finding
that the California statute was unconstitutional.193 Landlord's liens for rent

187. See generally Fr. STAT. §§713.0-.77 (1971).
188. Id.
189. FLA. STAT. §713.0 (1971) accords the statutory lien on personal property priority
in dignity to all accruing thereafter, and by virtue of the provisions of FLA. STAT.
§679.310 (1971), which is UNIwoRm COMMERCiAL CODE §9-310 (1962 and 1971 versions),
certain statutory Hens will take priority over a perfected security interest in personal

property.
190. FLA. STAT. §713.74 (1971) provides for acquisition of the statutory lien on personal
property "by any person in privity with the owner by the performance of the labor or
the furnishing of the materials."
191.

FLA. STAT. §85.011 (1) (1971) provides for retention of possession by the lienor

of both real and personal property for a period not exceeding three months.
192. 315 F. Supp. 109 (ND. Cal. 1970).
193. The court finds the loss to the debtor transcends the loss of wages in Sniadach
for several reasons, including the lack of any meaningful provision for exemptions to the
statutory lien and the inclusion of a greater portion of the debtor's property in the
taking. "[A]1l of the boarder's possessions may be denied him if such possessions are all
kept in his lodgings." Id. at 123. The court was not persuaded that the use of the lien to
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have likewise been found to be constitutionally infirm in Georgia,' 9 ' Pennsylvania, 95 and Illinois. 9 6
CONSENSUAL LIEN HOLDERS' PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES

The judicial expurgation of creditors' summary procedures on constitutional
grounds has not been limited to traditional practices of lienholders whose interests arise by operation of law but has also encompassed prejudgment remedies utilized by the holders of liens expressly created by the agreements of debtors and creditors. The claim of the mortgagee of real property and the creditor
having a security interest in some personal property of his debtor, the secured
party, is afforded protection by their foresight in obtaining lien creditor status.
When proper measures are taken to obtain protection against competing third
parties, ordinarily notice filing in the case of personalty and recordation in
the case of realty, 97 the holder of a consensual lien generally obtains priority
over the subsequently attaching liens or other interests of third parties both in
their individual capacities 98 and as representatives of creditors in collective
actions. 99
The secured party in personal property financing may, and most commonly does, leave possession of the collateral with the debtor.200 Therefore,
as there is no necessity for the secured party to deprive the debtor of possession of the collateral - at least not by state action - for his interest to attach
and obtain perfected status, 20 ' prejudgment deprivation will not be a factor

obtain jurisdiction over transients who frequent California hotels was a sufficient creditor
interest to justify relaxation of strict procedural safeguards. Id. at 124.
194. Blocker v. Blackburn, 228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d 56 (1971).
195. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
196. Collins v. The Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
197. Exemptions and alternatives to filing requirements to perfect a security interest
in personal property are catalogued in the UNIFORI COMMERCIAL CODE §9-302 (1962 and
1971 versions) [hereinafter cited as UCC]. Obviously, no attempt to explore these provisions
can be attempted herein, but the reader's attention is invited to that common exception
to the filing requirement encountered in the consumer finance market relating to "auto-

matic perfection" of purchase money security interests in certain consumer goods. See
UCC §§9-302 (1) (d), 9-307 (2) (1962 and 1971 versions).
198. The rule is not without exceptions. See, e.g., note 189 supra.
199. Some contractual liens, however, good under state law against third parties are

subject to the avoiding powers of the trustee in bankruptcy and, in particular, the trustee's
power to avoid preferential transfers under §60 of the Bankruptcy Act. See 11 U.S.C. §96

(1970).
200. Obviously, the very purpose of the loan is often defeated if the debtor is required
to forego use of the collateral by surrender of possession to the secured party prior to de-

fault. The interesting story of the development of non-possessory security devices in this
country is told by Professor Gilmore. See generally 1 G. GILMOaE, supra note 185.
201. This is not to say that modern security law, article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, does not recognize the oldest of personal property security devices, the pledge, where
collateral is delivered to the creditor at the time the loan is made or prior to default. See
UCC §9-203 (1) (a) (1962 and 1971 versions). Perfection of security interests in many types
of personal property may be achieved by possession of the collateral by the secured party.
See UCC §§9-302 (1) (a), 9-305 (1962 and 1971 versions).
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in the creation and perfection of security interests. But possession of the collateral by the debtor when coupled with the all too common characteristic
of the collateral to depredate rapidly in value, especially while the debtor
continues to use it, produces in the secured party justifiable interest in the
procedures enabling him to take possession of the collateral promptly upon
default by the debtor. It is to the remedies enabling the out-of-possession
secured party to take the collateral from the debtor that the rule in Sniadach
has been applied.
The secured party's right to possession is generally predicated upon the
event of default. 2°2 Although there is certainly respectable authority for the
proposition that a provision in the security agreement may validly provide for
the secured party's possession at any time without the necessity of default by
the debtor,203 the Uniform Commercial Code preconditions the secured party's
right to dispose of the collateral and thus realize the benefits of his security
upon the event of default.20 4 Default will occur when the debtor fails to make
payments or breaches any other covenant contained in the security agreement. 20 5 Although the secured party may dispose of the collateral after default while it is still in the possession of the debtor,20° creditor self-interest
almost always dictates that the acquiring of possession precede disposition of
the collateral.
Once default has occurred the Uniform Commercial Code provides: "In
taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this
can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action. 207
The Code does not provide for the form of the proceeding "by action," which
is an optional recovery method in all cases and will be necessitated when the
self-help alternative cannot produce recovery of the collateral absent breach
of the peace. Instead, the draftsmen have incorporated all local judicial
proceedings, which are provided by each state enacting the Code. In addition
to this recognition of repossession procedures existing apart from the provisions of the Code, the enforcement provisions of the Code 20
s are not exclusive, and the secured party "may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available judicial
procedure." 209 Accordingly, the procedures for possession and enforcement are
202. UCC §9-503 (1962 and 1971 versions).
203. Would a fine print clause in a contract of adhesion be given effect? Otherwise,
the pledge concept of security is still with us being incorporated within the UCC. See
2 G. GILMORE, supra note 185, §43.3; note 201 supra.
204. UCC §9-504 (1962 and 1971 versions). The secured party's right in proper cases
to accept the collateral in discharge of the obligation likewise is triggered by default. See
UCC §9-505 (1962 and 1971 versions).
205. See generally 2 G. GLMOP.E supra note 185, §43.3.
206. UCG §9-503 (1962 and 1971 versions).
207. Id.

208. The general enforcement provision of the Code is by nonjudidal public or private
sale of the collateral. See UCO §9-504 (1962 and 1971 versions). Other methods are pro.
vided, however, such as the right of the secured party in certain cases to retain the collateral
in satisfaction of the obligation. See UCC §9-505 (1962 and 1971 versions).
209. UCC §9-501 (1) (1962 and 1971 versions).
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not uniform from state to state and depending on the jurisdiction and choice
of alternatives, the secured party will resort to such remedies as replevin,
claim and delivery, judicial foreclosure sale, or execution issued on judgment for the unpaid obligation.
As previously noted, however, in most cases the secured party is desirous
of pursuing the remedy that will result in his possession of the collateral, or
at least the debtor's deprivation of the use of the collateral, at the earliest
time following default. Other factors bearing on the secured party's choice of
available remedies will be the expense and simplicity of the procedure and
its effectiveness in producing maximum realization within a minimum time
following default. When these considerations are examined the range of
practical alternatives in any given case is narrowed considerably.
While the Code explicitly provides for foreclosure of the security interest
by judicial sale pursuant to writ of execution issued on a previously obtained
judgment on the debt,21 ° the time and expense of obtaining the judgment
after default and the debtor's continued use of the property until seizure
under the execution writ only issued after judgment, militate against the
secured party's use of a remedy available to even general creditors.
Mortgage foreclosure proceedings of state law are also recognized by the
Code as a method of enforcing the security interest.211 When the secured
party wishes to proceed with caution, this choice of disposition as well as
judicial sale under execution may be recommended for the Code provides
that either of such dispositions "shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially reasonably. "212 The "commercial reasonableness" test of the Code
is indeed the key provision in Code default procedures, 213 but the draftsmen
of the Act expressly negate any inference that only sales under judicial proceedings should be deemed commercially reasonable.214 When the worth of
the collateral is small, as is the case of most security interests arising from
consumer transactions, judicial foreclosure is a relatively expensive method of
disposition and, although these expenses may be satisfied from the proceeds
of the sale, 21 5 the secured party whose collateral will not produce the amount
of the debtor's obligation must necessarily be interested in the economics of
the prospects of colthe disposition procedure. This is especially true when
21 6
lecting any deficiency from the debtor seem remote.
An additional disadvantage of the judicial foreclosure proceeding from the
creditor's viewpoint is the continued use by the debtor of the collateral. In
this case, however, the secured party in Florida may be protected if he has

210. UCC §9-501 (1962 and 1971 versions). The execution lien relates back to the date
of perfection of the security interest so no claim to priority of lien is sacrificed. Id.
211. Id.
212. UCC §9-507 (2) (1962 and 1971 versions).
213. See UCC §9-504 (3) (1962 and 1971 versions).
214. UCC §9-507 (2) (1962 and 1971 versions).
215. UCC §9-504 (1) (a) (1962 and 1971 versions).
216. The debtor's liability for a deficiency is contained in the Code. UCC §9-504(2)
(1961 and 1972 versions).
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statutory grounds to invoke the aid of attachment in aid of foreclosure. 217 The
statutory remedy is provided the creditor "who is commencing or has commenced an action to foreclose a mortgage on personal property." 218s Although
the statute is addressed to the holder of a particular kind of pre-Code security
device, the chattel mortgagee who had distinct need of such protection as his
only other means of taking possession by judicial action was by mortgage
foreclosure, 21 9 the only meaningful interpretation to give the provision,
220
since the enactment of the Code with its unified concept of security interest,
is to conclude that it applies to all secured creditors who have the requisite
grounds for its invocation.221
As replevin statutes commonly provide for a taking prior to judicial
hearing 222 and as presumably no reason exists to require the secured party to
use judicial foreclosure sale following seizure under the writ,223 the remedy
is understandably a favorite of secured parties. As previously noted, Florida
did not allow the pre-Code chattel mortgagee to make use of the writ of
replevin to obtain possession of the collateral but limited his judicial remedies to sale under mortgage foreclosure2 -4 with the ancillary remedy of attachment in aid of that action if elected in proper cases. Replevin procedure is
still governed, of course, by provisions outside those contained in the Code,
but as the pre-Code conditional vendor in Florida could make use of
22
replevin 25 and as the dichotomy was based on title and lien theory 6 no
227
longer viable under the Code, the better view would appear to be that all
secured creditors can now make use of replevin in this state. Otherwise, the
Florida courts must still distinguish between a chattel mortgagee and other
2
secured parties, a scheme not recognized by article nine of the Code. 28

217. See F".A. STAT. §76.07 (1971). The secured party is required to post bond as in
other cases of attachment. FLA. STAT. §76.12 (1971).

218. FLA. STAT. §76.07 (1971).
219. Snow v. Nowlin, 125 Fla. 166, 169 So. 598 (1936); Fincher Motors, Inc. v.
Northwestern Bank & Trust Co., 166 So. 2d 717 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
220. UCC §9-202 and comment; §9-507, comment 1 (1962 and 1971 versions), cf. In re
Yale Express Sys., Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
221. Cf. FLA. STAT. §680.104(4) (1971), which provides that the remedies otherwise
available to a secured party under the Code shall not be restricted by the chapter on
Attachment, but all such remedies shall be cumulatively available in accordance with
their respective terms.
222. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §78.01 (1971).
223. On the other hand, the use of the replevin writ should not excise the alternative
of judicial foreclosure proceedings as the method of disposition. See 2 G. GrLMoRE, supra
note 185, §44.1.
224. See text accompanying note 219 supra.
225. E.g., Evans v. Kloeppel, 72 Fla. 267, 73 So. 180 (1916).
226. Intertype Corp. v. Pulver, 2 F. Supp. 4 (S.D. Fla.), appeal dismissed, 56 F.2d
992 (5th Cir. 1932), aff'd, 65 F.2d 419 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 US. 660 (1933).
227. See note 220 supra.
228. See generally Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the UGC,
47 MINN. L. R1v. 205, 253 (1962). In Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Utah the enactment
of the official text of UCC §9-503 (1962 and 1971 versions) was altered by addition of the
following sentence: "If a secured party elects to proceed [to take possession] by process
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It has been previously advanced, although not authoritatively resolved, that
not only should all secured parties be able to invoke the replevin remedy
in Florida, but that the use of that remedy to obtain possession of the collateral should not dictate disposition in this state by judicial sale under mortgage foreclosure. Should the latter view prove erroneous, however, there is
still need for examining those Code provisions that provide for non-judicial
disposition as the procedure is available to the secured party who succeeds in
taking possession by self-help. Indeed, aside from some real practical limitations, there would appear to be no reason in law why the secured party could
not proceed with Code disposition procedures prior to taking possession. For
these reasons, disposition remedies provided specifically by the Code warrant
further examination.
In opting for permissive non-judicial disposition, 22 9 the draftsmen of the
Code were not according greater weight to the creditor's interests than those
of the debtor. The provisions are a manifestation of the convictions of the
draftsmen that judicial sales do not always produce maximum net realization.230 This underlying premise would appear to be a sound one, and the
policy can only further the interests of both parties as the other than judgment-proof debtor must have some concern for the grim reality of further
seizure under execution issued on deficiency judgment.
Therefore, the Code provides for public or private disposition proceedings
outside of the framework of judicial sales.231 A recognition that there are
creditors who would claim losses in excess of those that were or should have
been sustained, coupled with the difficulty of formulating a detailed procedure
to police the myriad and diverse transactions that may be encompassed, has
led to the imposition of a flexible rule for judicial application -the test of
commercial reasonableness.2 3 2 Although the Code provides for notice to the
debtor and certain interested third parties, 33 the most striking feature of
the disposition procedure specifically provided by the Code is its openendedness. While some attempt is made to set the standards for commercial
reasonableness in the statutes, 2 34 the test is primarily and must necessarily
remain one of judicial application to the facts of each case when the secured
party's methods are challenged either before or after disposition..235 Provisions
for the recovery of damages including a statutorily prescribed minimum re-

of law he may proceed by writ of replevin or otherwise." MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B,
§9-503 (2) (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 A, §9-503 (2) (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN.
§70A-9-503 (Supp. 1971). If this commentator's premise is correct, certainty in Florida
law could best be achieved by a similar enactment. Other vestiges of fragmented pre-Code
security law exist. E.g., FLA. STAT. §56.08 (1971).
229. UCC §9-504(3) (1962 and 1971 versions).
230. See id. comment 1; 2 G. Gn.MoRE, supra note 185, §44.6; Hogan, supra note 228,
at 219.
231. UCG §9-504(3) (1962 and 1971 versions).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See UCC §9.507(2) (1962 and 1971 versions).
235. U3CC §9-507 (1) (1962 and 1971 versions).
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covery against the financier of consumer goods should serve generally to make
the secured party responsible to his duties. 23 1
Under the common law replevin lay for the recovery of goods unlawfully taken; in cases of wrongful detention after lawful acquisition, the
common law action for recovery was detinue.2 3 7 These ancient distinctions
need no longer concern us, however, as modern procedure allows the plaintiff to utilize the replevin remedy based on wrongful detention, whether the
original taking was lawful or not. 238 Thus, the modern writ of replevin or its
statutory equivalent in some states, claim and delivery, 23 9 has utility to any
party who claims a right to immediate possession of personal property; a
right given the secured party upon the debtor's default.
Replevin procedure does provide some safeguards to the defendant. When
there is a prejudgment seizure of the property 240 the defendant in Florida has
three days from the seizure to give bond with surety for double the value of
the property and obtain its redelivery from the executing officer.4 Otherwise, the property shall be delivered to the plaintiff. 242 Where the defendant
who is a debtor in a secured transaction obtains possession by such forth'coming bond, however, and the plaintiff is successful in his action, the plaintiff shall take judgment for the property and against the defendant and
the surety on the forthcoming bond for the amount of plaintiff's lien on that
property. 243 As the plaintiff may then enforce his judgment at his election by
recovery of the property or the amount adjudged against the defendant and
his surety, that is the amount of the lien,244 his choice of recovery on the bond
will enable him to make full collection of the debtor's obligation even when
the value of the collateral would not have been sufficient to fully secure him.
It would appear, however, that in those cases where the debtor is financially
able to give a forthcoming bond, he would elect instead to redeem the collateral under the provisions of the Code. 245 In either event though the
secured party would be paid in full and the debtor would reobtain the
collateral.
As is true with the prejudgment remedies of attachment and garnishment,
the plaintiff who utilizes replevin for prejudgment seizure is required prior
to the issuance of the writ to file bond with surety for double the value of
the property.246 When the defendant prevails in the suit and the property
236. Id.

237. R.

MsurLAR, Crvm PRocED UE oF THE TRIAL COURT IN

ISTORICAL PERSPE'SIVE

472-73 (1952).
238. 'Id. at 503.'"
239. 77 C.J.S. Replevin
240. Florida gives the
STAT. §78.01 (1971).
241. FIA. STAT. §78.13
242. Id.
243. FLA. STAT. §78.19

§1 (1952).
plaintiff the option of seizure before or after judgment. FLA.
(1971).
(1971).

244. Id.

245. UCC §9-506 (1962 and 1971 versions).
246. FLA. STAT. §78.07 (1971). No bond is required where the plaintiff requests
seizure only after judgment. FLA. STAT, §78.01 (1971).
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has been redelivered to him on his forthcoming bond "he shall have judgment against the plaintiff and the sureties upon his bond for his damages for
the taking of the property and for his costs." 247 When the property has not
been redelivered to the defendant who prevails in the action he shall have
judgment "against the plaintiff for possession thereof and costs and against
him and his surety for the value of the property and costs." 248 The defendant
in enforcing his judgment is then expressly given the same election provided
2 49
the successful plaintiff is out of possession.
The foregoing discussion has endeavored to analyze the fundamental
differences between secured parties and creditors who obtain liens by operation
of law. The analysis also reveals, however, a striking parallel in certain default proceedings given the secured party and other prejudgment remedies
found constitutionally wanting. By resort to such remedies as replevin, claim
and delivery, and attachment in aid of mortgage foreclosure, the secured
party at least temporarily deprives the debtor of his interests prior to notice
and hearing. Counsel for debtors were not long in drawing upon the analogy,
and secured parties in the important commercial states of New York 259 and
then California2 5 1 were soon without prejudgment judicial repossession procedures. Contrariwise, the Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the
secured party's use of the prejudgment replevin law of Oklahoma 25 2 while
federal district courts reached like results in passing upon similar proceedings
2
in Florida,253 Maryland,254 and Pennsylvania. 55
Various factors account for the conflict resulting from the application of
due process standards. Some of these factors are common to the previous examination of attachment, garnishment, and service lien remedies; others,
however, reflect differences in judicial acceptance of the unique aspects of
the secured creditor's position. In Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co. the
court restricted Sniadach to a taking of property that may impose tremendous
hardships on the debtor but found "beds, stoves, mattresses, dishes, tables,
and other necessaries for ordinary day-to-day living" to be within the protected
class. 296 Blair v. Pitchess recognized not only the direct detrimental effect of
the seizure of such personal property upon the debtor, but additionally the
unwarranted leverage the process may give the creditor.257 In the lower
court's holding in Epps v. Cortese, however, it was noted that "stereo sets,
247.

FLA. STAT.

248.

FLA. STAT.

249.
250.

§78.20 (1971).
§78.21 (1971)

(emphasis added).
Id.
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y.

1970) (three-

judge court).
Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (three-judge court),
and remanded sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
254. Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971).
255. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (three-judge court), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Parham v. Cortese, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
256. 315 F. Supp. 716, 722-23 (M.D.N.Y. 1970).
257. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 279, 486 P.2d 1242, 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 57 (1971).
251.
252.
253.
vacated
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rings, diamond watches, tables, stools, and beds" are property that the debtor
can temporarily live without while wages are the means for the purchase
of the "necessities of life." 258 The federal district court in Fuentes v. Faircloth,
distinguishing prejudgment replevin from the Supreme Court's holdings in
Goldberg and Sniadach, concluded: "The hardships facing the welfare recipient, like those facing one whose wages are garnished, are not present in
259
the instant situation where goods purchased are replevied.
Although the contrary results are in some measure attributable to differing
conclusions as to the type of property within the protection of Sniadach,
the primary issue framed by the opposing cases would appear to be differing
judicial views on the constitutional validity of the special creditor interest
presented. Brunswick Corporation v. J & P, Inc. observed no comparison
between prejudgment garnishment of wages and the enforcement of a security
agreement. -60 The lower court in Epps noted that the creditor sought
"specifically identifiable property to which he has reserved title." 261 It may
be meaningfully observed that the special creditor interest accorded protection
in these cases was special only in the sense that the creditor had a property
interest by contract in the particular goods seized unlike the attaching or
service lien creditor prior to seizure-in Code parlance a security interest.
To this extent the cases upholding the secured party's right to a prejudgment
taking recognized a new dimension in the previously examined area of
special creditor's interest.
The position is not without merit. The existing property interest of the
secured party is important not only in the abstract legal sense but more so
in terms of its application in the workings of a credit economy. In determining
whether to grant credit, firms in the finance industry have long concerned
themselves with what is characterized as the "four C's" of risk determination. 262 The three factors of character, capacity, and conditions, which relate
respectively to the debtor's attitudes toward debt repayment, his ability to
repay based on the specifics of his income, and a forecast of the relevant
economic conditions over which the debtor has no control are of only indirect
interest to this study. The fourth factor of credit worthiness, capital that has
reference to the assets of the debtor that may be seized in the event of failure
to pay, is highly relevant. Because consumers often have few assets with any
appreciable market value, 263 it may be concluded that this factor is negligible
in consumer finance. But if to the concept of general assets of the debtor, the
capital factor, we engraft with appropriate alliteration, the collateralization
258. 326 F. Supp. 127, 133 (E.D. Pa. 1971), vacated and remanded sub nor. Parham v.
Cortese, 407 US. 67 (1972).
259. 317 F. Supp. 954, 958 (SMD.Fla. 1970), vacated and remanded sub nom. Fuentes v.

Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
260. 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1970).
261. 826 F. Supp. 127, 133 (ED. Pa. 1971), vacated and remanded sub nom. Parham v.
Cortese, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
262. See generally T. BECKmA & R. Fosrz, CRrES Mw COLLECONS: MANAGEmmT
AND THEORY 82-91 (8th ed. 1969).
263. Id. at 85.
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of the loan, the converse of these arguments may be the more compelling.
Because the consumer has few if any other assets out of which collection may
be made, and because, traditionally at least, the secured consumer financier
has been able to take possession of particular property, collateral, either without resort to legal process or at least prior to notice and hearing in a judicial
proceeding, the capital factor where reinforced by collateralization of the loan
may be of real importance in any determination to extend credit. The
argument would appear to be of even greater import in consumer financing
of low income families where consideration of various of the other determin26 4
ants of credit extension tend to negate acceptance of the credit application.
The market value of chattel security is a fleeting thing, however. Previous
discussion has focused on the secured party's desire to promptly take possession
after default and thereby forego further loss in value of the collateral. This
diminution is not only a result of the continuing reasonable or even accelerated use or misuse of the goods by the debtor but, in the glitter of a
market beset with frequent model changes and, therefore, some degree of
enforced obsolescence, is attributable also to mere passage of time.
The ability of the financier to be adequately secured by resort to the
collateral upon default has not been enhanced by the trends of reduction
of down payment requirements and extension of the contract term that has
accompanied the growth of installment credit in this country. 265 From rerequirements of a down payment equal to one-third the price of the car and
amortization of the balance over twelve months characteristic of the 1920's,
the industry had moved by the decade of the 60's to a down payment of about
one-fourth of the discounted cash price and a term of thirty to thirty-six
months for installment payments.

266

This data simply points up what so many

of us as debtors must intuitively realize: That when the new car is driven
from the showroom the amount we have paid prior to delivery is far from
equal of what we have unfortunately yet to pay. The corollary of this statement is that the investment and thus economic interest of our financier in the
collateral at that time and perhaps for many months to come is in excess of our
own. Thus, the secured party's legal interest is coupled with a significant
economic one. 267 Although judicial decisions imposing prior notice and hearing requirements may well retard the efforts of the secured party to take
possession, they do not hold in abeyance the laws of marketing economics
and the value of the collateral, which may be marginal or insufficient to
liquidate the indebtedness at the time of default, will most assuredly con-

264. See Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor- Oriented Viewpoint, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 445, 448 (1968).
265. See P. McCRPAC, EN, J. MAO & C. FRICKE, CONSUMER INSrALLMENT CREDIT AND PUBUc
POLICY 1-2 (1965).
266. Id. Even the most casual observer of the advertising media is aware of the
availability today of 48 month financing for new automobiles.
267. "It goes without saying that in the typical installment sale of personal property
both seller and buyer have interests in the property until the purchase price is fully paid,
the seller early in the transaction often having more at stake than the buyer." Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 99 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
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tinue to depredate during the interim between default and adjudication. Of
course it is unlikely that the debtor will continue in the interim to make off2 68
setting payments on his obligation..
Sniadach couched the countervailing rights to the debtor's interest in
continued possession or immediate right to possession in terms of circumstances "requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest."269 In this
context the foregoing discussion has equated the secured party's interest
with a creditor interest, but the analysis need not be so limited. Although the
interests of any one debtor and his secured party may well be adverse, the
interests of debtors and creditors collectively is largely compatible. It is
axiomatic that one of the expenses incurred in the extension of credit is bad
debt losses. 270 It is also elementary economic law that in the private sector
of our economy all costs of successful businessmen must be passed on to their
customers..2 71 Thus, when the debtor's need for credit at minimal cost is seen
to be determined in some measure by the value of chattel security, there is
validity to the argument that there is more at stake than a mere creditor
interest. The lower court in Epps recognized the breadth of this interest by
noting not only the debtor's dependency on credit to obtain expensive goods,
but the importance of summary procedures in the maintenance of many large
and small retail businesses and in the reduction of costs incurred in evidentiary
272
hearings.
The foregoing discussion has assumed the useful function served by consumer credit in our economy. To recognize that all the advantages associated
with mass markets for consumer durables are dependent on readily available
financing is to recognize the important role played by the credit industry in
our economic development. 27 3 A recognition of the abuses of credit by the
overextension of some debtors and the overreaching of some creditors serves
only to point out that the system is obviously an imperfect one.
The observations, however, may also aid in formulating the basic issue in
determining due process requirements in the area of chattel security. Should
the importance of chattel security to the economy be outweighed by the
possibility of the secured creditor's erroneous allegation of default so as to
require notice and hearing before any seizure of the collateral? In a 4-to-3

268. "At least the debtor, who is very likely uninterested in a speedy resolution that
could terminate his use of the property, should be required to make those payments, into
court or otherwise, upon which his right to possession is conditioned." Id. at 102 (citations

omitted).
269. 395 US. 337, 339 (1969).
270. A compendium of the various factors that constitute the costs of credit extension
is contained in T. Bzcxw,,N& R. Fosm, supra note 262, at 69.
271. Of course increments of costs may be reflected wholly or partially in profits as
well as in prices. The factors are complex and the consequences of increased competition
in the consumer finance industry on the costs and availability of credit are inconclusive.
See White, Consumer Credit in the Ghetto: UCCC Free Entry Provisions-and the Federal
Trade Commission Study, 25 BusiNmss Law. 143 (special issue 1969).
272. 326 F. Supp. at 135-36.
273. See generally P. McCRAcKE_,

J. Mxo & C. Flicxyz supra note 265, at 1-6.
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decision in Fuentes v. Shevin the Supreme Court in ruling on the district
courts' decisions upholding the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes
failed to find a constitutional distinction between the contractual basis of the
secured creditor's interest and the prejudgment garnishment of wages by a
general creditor.274 The Court did more, however, and a close reading of the
due process tests of Fuentes is not only necessary to assess the present status
of the secured creditor's position, but also to put in proper perspective the
rules formulated for those previously examined remedies under attachment,
garnishment, and service lien procedures.
THE PRESENT STATUS OF CREDITORS' PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES

The Supreme Court's basis in Fuentes for according the secured creditor
no better treatment in prejudgment judicial seizures than the creditor whose
lien arose by operation of law is primarily the result of an express recognition
of and emphasis on the debtor's present possessory interest. Applying the
fourteenth amendment's protection of property to "any significant property
interest" the Court concludes: "The appellants were deprived of such an
interest in the replevied goods - the interest in continued possession and use
of the goods." 275 This argument is bolstered by the Court's observation that
for immediate possession the debtors had obligated themselves "to pay a
major finance charge beyond the basic price of the merchandise" and in fact
27 61
"Clearly, their
had made substantial payments by the time of repossession.
contract, was
by
protected
possessory interest in the goods, dearly bought and
2 -77
"
Clause.
Process
Due
the
of
protection
sufficient to invoke the
Although the Court does recognize "'extraordinary situations' that justify
' 27 8
the criteria of situations
postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing,"
"requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest" enunciated in
Sniadach2 "9 are stated in Fuentes in terms of necessity "to secure an important
'2 0
No explanation is offered for the
governmental or general public interest."
removal of "creditor interests" from the "extraordinary situations" test, but
perhaps of greater importance in view of the preceeding discussion is the
Court's characterization of the Florida and Pennsylvania proceedings as furthering "no more than private gain." 28 1 In this fashion the general interest
of the public in the availability of credit at low cost and the analogous contribution of prejudgment repossession of chattel security to that end is summarily dismissed.
Stressing that only the opportunity to be heard must be provided, the

274. 407 US. 67 (1972).
275. Id. at 86.
276. Id.

277. Id. (footnote omitted).
278. Id. at 90.
279.
280.
281.

395 U.S. at 839.
407 U.S. at 91.
Id.
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Court in a footnote cautions against an exaggeration of the aggregate costs
as "there is a likelihood that many defendants would forego their opportunity sensing the futility of the exercise in the particular case." 2 2 The
statement offers no consideration of that other element of costs, the depreciation of the collateral during the interval between notice and the date set
for disposition of the case. With crowded court dockets and the granting
of continuances to even the debtor who subsequently fails to contest at the
date set for the hearing, this cost could be substantial.
In addition to limiting extraordinary situations to ones that secure "an
important governmental or general public interest" the majority in Fuentes
further defined the concept by interpretation of precedent as embodying "a
special need for very prompt action" and one in which "the State has kept
strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force."28 3 The Florida and
Pennsylvania replevin statutes also failed to qualify under the latter two tests.
Recognizing that "there may be cases in which a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods,"
the Court concluded that neither were the statutes narrowly drawn nor did
the facts encompass such an unusual situation.284 The "need for prompt
action" recognized by Fuentes once more failed to distinguish between the
secured creditor's position vis-a-vis that of the garnishment creditor and it
would appear that except for the possible exception subsequently noted,28 5
what would encompass extraordinary situations for the one would do likewise
for the other.
Finally, the Court held that the prejudgment replevin statutes of Florida
and Pennsylvania "abdicate effective state control over state power." 28 6
Having noted that the writs issued on "no more than the strength of the applicant's own belief in his rights," 287 the Court observed the absence of a
state official's participation in the decision to seek the remedy, to review the
basis for the claim to repossession, and to evaluate the need for immediate
seizure."288s 1 Issuance of the prejudgment replevin writ on the creditor's allegations alone without an ex parte appearance before a judge to make a
prima fade showing of entitlement appears to be the practice in all but
one state 2 9 where the process has been recently tested. It would seem unrealistic in the context of individual actions by creditors to impose state
participation in the decision to seek the remedy. State review of the basis of
the claim and evaluation of the need for summary seizure could presumably

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. n.29.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 93.
See text accompanying note 290 infra.
407 U.S. at 93.

287. Id. at 83.
288. Id. at 93.
289. The Maryland procedure upheld in Wheeler v. Adams, 322 F. Supp. 645, 648-

49 (D. Md. 1971), required the creditor to appear personally before a judge and make a
prima fade case.
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be provided at some cost by vesting the power to issue the writs in a state
official with discretionary powers.
One further amplification of the "extraordinary situations" test is contained in Fuentes. The Court states: "These situations, however, must be
truly unusual." 0° The extent of the caveat is not easily assessed but some
further indicia of permissive use of prejudgment seizure may be found in the
Court's citation in Fuentes, as it did in Sniadach, to the case of Ownbey v.
Morgan.2 91 Ownbey is cited for the proposition that "attachment necessary
to secure jurisdiction in state court [is] clearly a most basic and important
public interest." 29 2 It would appear then that prejudgment seizure for juris-

dictional purposes is still viable, but the statement of the Fuentes Court may
well adopt the more restrictive view "that availability to personal service and
not mere nonresidency" 29 3 is the determinative factor.
Previous discussion of Sniadach and the lower court cases, which attempted to delimit the rule therein, has revealed that the pre-Fuentes test
of permissive prejudgment seizures was a product of two factors - not only
the special need of the creditor for the process but the balancing of that
interest with the hardship to the debtor presented by temporary deprivation
of the type of property seized. There was soon precedent as previously examined to support three conflicting views of the latter element. A narrow
view of Sniadach that limited its application to wages alone was transformed
by some courts to include any necessities, but still others refused to recognize
any distinctions founded on gradations in the importance of the property
to the debtor. As the difficulty of delineating the categories of necessities is
great and as the limitation of the protection to wages alone seems unjustifiable, it is not surprising that the sanction of the Supreme Court in Fuentes
2 94
was given the latter doctrine.
That the decision adds certainty to the law is undeniable. Indeed many
of the variances in setting due process standards in the cases examined in this
work are attributable to this one issue. Although the Fuentes Court disclaims
any extension of the rules laid down in Sniadach and Goldberg, in this respect
attributing its discussion of the importance of the property interest before the
Court in those cases to mere emphasis of "special importance, ' 29 5 it seems that
Fuentes did extend the rule of Sniadach to all property. 296 Otherwise the

290.
291.
292.
293.
senting
294.
295.

407 U.S. at 90.
256 U.S. 94 (1921).
407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567, 580 (D.D.C. 1970) (three-judge court) (disopinion).
407 U.S. at 89-90.
Id. at 89.

296. When prejudgment attachment of real property does not dispossess the debtor of
the use thereof at least until after opportunity for hearing (see text accompanying notes
165-167 supra), the extension of Sniadach to all property may still not cause attachment of
land to fall within prior notice and hearing requirements even when an extraordinary
creditor need is not present. The distinction is not based on the type of property but the
absence of deprivation.
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opinions of those many able jurists who struggled with formulating a property
test must be written off to a futile exercise based on a misreading of Sniadach,
a position not seemingly tenable. Whether by extension or reaffirmation
though, the Fuentes Court emphasized that Sniadach and Goldberg did not
mark "a radical departure from established principles of procedural due
process" but "were in the mainstream of past cases having little or nothing to
2 97
do with the absolute 'necessities' of life."
In summary, the post-Fuentes extraordinary situations that obviate the
need for notice and hearing before the taking in a judicial action must be
based on important governmental or general public interests and the interest
of a secured creditor is not per se in that category but must qualify specially.
In the context of debtor and creditor law this basis would probably include a
taking necessary to secure jurisdiction and cases where damage or concealment of the goods in dispute is eminent. 298 This latter category may be
limited by the language in Fuentes to those cases where the creditor claims
a right against specific goods of his debtor, as in cases of security interests or
perhaps service hens on particular property, and thus may not be available
to the attachment or garnishment creditor who may subject the general
property of his debtor to seizure. -99 The absence of any particular hardship
to the debtor resulting from temporary deprivation of the particular property
seized has no place in the test. Finally, it would appear that even when otherwise proper, the writ commanding the prejudgment seizure, whether it be in
replevin, attachment, or garnishment, must be the result of a judicial act.
Another issue, which had contributed in some measure to the conflicting
decisions of the lower courts in the context of prejudgment replevin, is laid
to rest in Fuentes. Preceeding discussion has established that in modern personal property security financing not utilizing a pledge of the collateral, the
secured party's right to take possession by Code provision and usually contract term as well is predicated on the event of default. The Laprease court
in striking New York's replevin statutes distinguished the Tenth Circuit's
upholding of Oklahoma's prejudgment replevin procedures in Brunswick at
least in part "by reason of the admission by the defendants in the replevin
action [in Brunswick] that they were in default under the conditional sale
contract." 300 In the lower court's disposition of Fuentes the debtor attempted
to distinguish Brunswick on the grounds inter alia that although she was delinquent in payments she could not be in default when there had been a

297. 407 U.S. at 88.
298. Presumably then the pre-Fuentes holding of the Court in Jernigan v. Economy

Exterminating Co., 327 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (three-judge court), would still be
viable. In that case the disputed automobile had been hidden and the court found "a
situation requiring special protection" under a statute "narrowly drawn." Id. at 30.
299. That distinction, if there is one, is based on the Court's statement that the
summary action might lie on "a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy
or conceal disputed goods:" 407 U.S. at 93 (emphasis added). The writer questions whether

there are goods in dispute when attachment or garnishment is ancillary to a suit on an
ordinary indebtedness.
800. 315 F. Supp. 716, 724 (NJD.N.Y. 1970).
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breach of the contract by the seller.3 0 1 The effort was unavailing, however,
as the Court construed the contract literally to allow the secured party the
right of possession "not in the event of mere 'default,' " but "in the event of
'default of any payment or payments,' "302 thus triggering the seller's remedies
when the buyer was delinquent regardless of justification. In view of the
buyer's statutory right on notice to deduct damages resulting from breach from
any part of the price still due under the contract,30 3 the reasoning is questionable, but the Supreme Court opinion in Fuentes would render that
exercise moot. That decision unequivocally makes the issue of default vel
non immaterial in invoking procedural safeguards. 30 4 In so holding the Court
exposes an inherent weakness in the argument previously advanced for
according the secured party's status such recognition as a weighty interest
deserving of protection and justifying a temporary prejudgment taking. When
the secured party's right to possession of the collateral does not arise until
default, and that is the usual case, the secured party's present interest does
not include a right to possession until the resolution of an issue that requires
judicial determination. Of course, the contention that the public's interest
in the availability of secured credit transcends the harm to those non-defaulting debtors whose property is temporarily taken might still have appeal although it is without judicial sanction after Fuentes.
Closely related to the issue of default as actuating the secured party's
right to possession is the issue of advance contractual waiver of procedural
due process rights. In its recent decision in D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.
the Supreme Court had recognized that prejudgment notice and hearing are
subject to waiver in a civil action, and upheld the validity of a cognovit
provision in a note in conformity with Ohio law whereby the maker consented in advance of any actual dispute to judgment without notice or hearing should it default in payments.,30 5 Certainly if the debtor may waive procedural safeguards in the action that establishes his default for purposes of
judgment on the primary issue of the indebtedness, then he may do likewise
on the issue of default giving rise to the secured party's claim of right to
take possession of the collateral, merely an intermediate step in establishing
the final rights of the parties.
The concept was recognized by the Court in Fuentes, but in none of the
contracts before the Court did the language relied upon establish the requisite
intent of the parties to create such a waiver. 300 Dispositive of the issue was
the Court's conclusion that those terms providing for repossession upon
301. 317 F. Supp. at 957-58.
302. Id. at 958.
303. See UCC §2-717 (1962 version).
304. 407 U.S. at 87. "But even assuming that the appellants had fallen behind in
their installment payments, and that they had no other valid defenses, that is immaterial
here. The right to be heard does not depend upon an advance showing that one will
surely prevail at the hearing." Id. (footnotes omitted). Litigable issues in hearings may be
subject to statutory limitations, however. See text accompanying note 320 infra.
305. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
306. 407 U.S. at 94-95.
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default did not "indicate how or through what process" the repossession was
to be made.307 The issue as thus developed seems to allow secured parties to
maintain their prejudgment seizure rights in judicial actions by retailoring
the security agreement. This solution by draftsmanship may well be controlling
in the context of such an agreement as was before the Court in Overmyer,
but the rule of that case and the language of the Court in Fuentes made clear
that there are real limits to the creditor's ability to draft away his problem.
Fuentes observes that the contract in the Overmyer case was negotiated between corporations and that the waiver clause was a result of negotiations bargained for and drafted by parties represented by counsel.308 Contrasting this
substantial commercial transaction with the setting in which consumer financing occurs is not difficult. The lack of equality in bargaining power and the
element of unfair surprise, which are so often the rule in consumer transactions, will no doubt militate against judicial acceptance of waiver of
constitutional rights in the form contracts common to consumer finance 0 9
The parallel between the doctrine of waiver of constitutional rights and the
Code's concept of unconscionability3'0 is striking, and an appreciation of the
policing function of the courts in the former may be gained by study of those
cases interpreting the related doctrine of the Code.31 '
Fuentes furthermore reaffirms and in some instances amplifies in the
creditor-debtor context basic tenets of due process recognized in Sniadach. The
hearing must be at a "meaningful time," which requires notice and hearing
before the seizure "to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations."31 2 Although the taking without hearing under the prejudgment writ
may be only temporary, the Court holds that "it is now well settled that
a temporary nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in
the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment."'3' Not surprisingly, the deterrent
effects of the requirements that the plaintiff in replevin post a bond, "allege
conclusorily that he is entitled to specific goods, and open himself to possible
liability in damages if he is wrong," were found to be no substitute for the
basic notice and hearing requirements.-1 4 Nor was it significant that the defendant in replevin could recover the goods on posting of counterbond, since
the prejudgment deprivation is still present whether or not the defendant
and the time needed to take advantage of
"has the funds, the knowledge
3 15
the recovery provision.

307. Id. at 96 (emphasis by the Court).
308. Id. at 95.
309. See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258,
486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
310. See UCC §2-302 (1962 version).
311. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
312. 407 U.S. at 81.
313. Id. at 84-85 (citations omitted).
314. Id. at 83.
315. Id. at 85.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss1/3

46

Williams: Creditor's Prejudgement Remedies: Expandng Strictures on Traditio
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

Fuentes is replete with comments as to the type of hearing required. The
Court reaffirms that "due process tolerates variances in the form of a hearing
.appropriate to the nature of the case' and 'depending upon the importance
of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings [if
any]' ... ."a The requirement that the plaintiff post bondb and the salutary
effects of provisions for the defendant's counterbond on "the length and
consequent severity of a deprivation"c are both relevant in determining the
type of hearing required. Finally, the hearing that must predate seizure
except in extraordinary situations does not have to result in a "final judgment," is "open to many potential variations" and is a subject "for legislation" provided that it establish "the validity or at least the probable validity
of the underlying claim."'
Legislative implementation of these edicts in the form of early-trial provisions with limitations on litigable issues may offer creditors more palatable forms of hearings even when their attempt at contractual waiver of
the hearing has failed. The recent constitutional test of Oregon's procedure
for eviction of tenants after nonpayment of rent points the way. In Lindsey
v. Normete there was a statutory requirement of a trial no later than six
days after service of the complaint unless the tenant provided security for
the accruing rent. There was also a statutory limitation of the triable issue
to the tenant's default thereby precluding consideration of defenses based
on the landlord's breach of a duty to maintain the premises. Both provisions passed due process and equal protection tests.f It is highly probable,
therefore, that creditors will soon lobby for statutes that use Lindsey as a
model and thereby mitigate the rigors of expanded hearing requirements.
Pre-Fuentesreplevin cases had added new dimensions to the constitutional
scrutiny of creditors' provisional remedies. The prejudgment replevin provisions of New York and California were not only found to constitute a
deprivation of due process but additionally to run afoul of the fourth
amendment's strictures against unreasonable search and seizure made applicable to the states by the fourteenth. 16 While other lower courts had reached
opposite results, 31

the Supreme Court by its holding in Fuentes found the

issue of due process to be determinative and did not reach the fourth amendment contentions of the debtors. The Court does note, however, that satisfaction of the dictates of due process by proof of the probable validity of
a. Id. at 82 (citations omitted) (emphasis by the Court).
b. Id. at 83.
c. Id. at 86.
d. Id. at 97.
e. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
f. Id. at 64. The additional appeal bond requirements imposed on the tenants did
violate their rights to equal protection of the laws. Id. at 74.
316. E.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (threejudge court); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
317. See Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (three-judge court), vacated
and remanded sub norn. Parham v. Cortese, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Wheeler v. Adams Co.,
322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970)
(three-judge court), vacated and remanded sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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the creditor's claim may well serve the dual function of obviating the fourth
amendment problem. 3"s
Fuentes will have a profound influence on the use of provisional remedies
by creditors. The case not only brought the secured party's prejudgment
judicial remedies into substantial conformance with those of other creditors
but also made sufficient inroads on the general doctrine of permissive prejudgment seizures as it had been developed by some courts through rejection
of a "necessities" test. Sniadach was transitional at least in the application of
due process to debtor-creditor law; Fuentes is a broad extension thereof.
But is the constitutional erosion of provisional remedies complete? In
previous discussion it has been noted that under the Code the secured party
on default may take possession of the collateral "without judicial process if
this can be done without breach of the peace."319 The secured party will
commonly first attempt to gain possession in this manner 20 as a recovery
under judicial process, even of the prejudgment variety, entails both additional time and expense. The permissive self-help remedy, the standards of
which are not set forth by the Code, has encompassed everything from gently
persuading the debtor to expressly and voluntarily surrender the collateral
to recapturing the property without the debtor's knowledge or consent such
as by the simple expedient of a driveaway of the unattended automobile.321
The latter procedure exposes the creditor to the debtor's claim that he had
valuable goods in the vehicle and the self-help remedy should always be
employed with circumspection as punitive damages for breach of the peace
3
may be substantial. 22
In Adams v. Egley 23 repossession of vehicles was accomplished without
judicial process under both the provisions of the Code and the terms of the
security agreements expressly entitling the secured parties to take possession in
the event of default3 21 The creditors therefore contended that as the repossessions had occurred under the self-executing terms of private contracts there
was no significant state involvement so as to raise federal question jurisdiction 325 under due process or jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act providing for remedies when there is deprivation "under color of state law."326 Rejecting that contention the Court held that as the contractual terms were
merely an embodiment of the policy contained in California's Code provisions,
318. 407 U.S. at 96 n.32. Another constitutional attack leveled at the writs in some
of the lower court cases was that the provision for defendant's counterbond in the case
of an impecunious debtor was a denial of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., LaPrease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y.
1970) (three-judge court). The Supreme Court does not address the issue.
319. UCC §9-503 (1962 and 1971 versions).
320. See Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47 MINN.

L. REv.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

205, 211 (1962).
See 2 G. GILmomr, SEcURITY INTEREsTs IN PERSONAL
Id.
338 F. Supp. 614 (SMD. Cal. 1972).
Id. at 616.
28 US.C. §1331 (1970).
28 U.S.C. §1343 (1970); 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970).
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the repossessions were made "under color of state law" and that the enactment of the Code provisions authorizing such acts were sufficient state action
to raise a federal question. 327
Previous examination of cases invalidating distraint proceedings under
statutes providing for landlord's liens for rent has revealed that state action
32
may encompass other than seizure under judicial process by state officers.
In most of these cases the self-help provision was based exclusively on the
terms of the statute 329 in contrast with the contract terms providing for selfhelp repossession in Adams. The Court concluded, however, that even if an
independent right to repossess were created by contract, that right was the
result of state authorization. 330
Certainly in view of the subsequent Supreme Court holding in Fuentes,
the position of the Adams Court is defensible to the extent that it invalidates
California's Code provision authorizing self-help repossession.3 3 1 If the secured
party cannot resort to judicial action to obtain possession prior to hearing,
a fortiori, he should not be able to accomplish these same ends without
judicial process.
Presumably, although the facts are unclear, the repossessions in Adams
were not made with even the implicit consent of the debtors, 332 for the Court
limits its discussion in failing to find a waiver of constitutional rights to a
consideration of waiver before default. 33 3 Certainly a better argument could
be made for meaningful waiver of hearing before repossession if the debtor
had consented to the return of the collateral after the alleged default. Hopefully, the secured party is not required to use judicial process when the debtor
tenders back the collateral.
But Adams does not only invalidate the Code section providing for res 34
Bepossession, but strikes the disposition provisions of the Code as well.
Code
the
of
procedures
disposition
to
the
Court
the
of
cause the objections
are not separately stated, it may be assumed the Court is concluding that any
invalidation of a wrongful repossession procedure should also necessarily encompass an invalidation of the attendant disposition proceedings. That is to
say, Adams strikes the Code's disposition procedure only because it complements the constitutionally infirm Code repossession procedures, and that where
327. 338 F. Supp. at 618. Contra, Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal.
1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
328. See text accompanying notes 192-196 supra.
329. In Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970), a written lease provision
also permitted levies and sales, but the contract term was held not to create a right to
distrain independently of the statute.
330. 338 F. Supp. at 618.
331. UCC §9-503 (1962 and 1971 versions).
32. See 338 F. Supp. at 616.
333. 338 F. Supp. at 619-21.
334. See UCC §9-504 (1962 and 1971 versions). While California law encompasses the
exact text of §9-503 of the Code, there are variations in that state's adoption of §9-504.
Compare CAL. COMM. CODE §9504 (West 1964), with UCC §9-504 (1962 and altered 1971
versions). The variations in the California enactment do not seem relevant to the issue
in Adams, however.
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repossession is rightful, the non-judicial disposition proceedings of the Code
are not unconstitutional.
The opinion is not dear, however, and the Court's statement that "the
statutes providing for summary repossession and sale must be held unconstitutional,335 lends itself to dual interpretations. If the adjective "summary"
modifies the term "repossession" only, then the reasoning just advanced is
sound, but if "summary" modifies "sales" as well, then one federal judge with
one stroke of his pen has summarily rejected that reasoning that caused
the draftsmen of the Code after careful study to conclude that both debtor
and creditor benefit by flexible disposition procedures that do not require
judicial sale.330 Hopefully, the latter interpretation is erroneous for it would
appear that at least some reason for the rejection of basic Code disposition
83
policy should have been advanced. 3
Furthermore, there is support for validating non-judicial sales by the
holders of consensual liens in the case of Young v. Ridley.338 In that case the
Court refused to invalidate under Sniadach statutes authorizing mortgagees of
real property under instruments containing powers of sale to foreclose by
public auction without a hearing for the mortgagor prior to sale.33 9 Although the court relies to some extent on the contractual waiver of hearing
provision,3 40 and this reliance in a consumer transaction may be misplaced
under the subsequent ruling in Fuentes, the Court advances further reasons
341
for its decision. The provisions for statutory notice to the debtor in Young
are not unlike those provided for extrajudicial sale under the Code,3 42 and
the Court noted that the draftsmen of the statutes tested in Young felt that
judicial foreclosure would unduly restrict legitimate business interests and
thus the availability of mortgage money.3 4 3 Furthermore, Young relied on the
right of the mortgagor to seek remedies such as emergency injunctive relief
during the interval between receipt of notice and sale,3 4 4 remedies not at all
3 45
unlike those accorded the debtor under the Code.
Hopefully then, if Adams is read as a decision declaring unconstitutional
the non-judicial sales provisions of the Code, it will be an aberrant one.
In its extension of constitutionally restricted action to non-judicial repossession remedies alone, however, it represents a major but perhaps predic335. 338 F. Supp. at 622.
336. See UCC §9-504, Comment 1 (1962 and 1971 versions); 2 G.
note 321, §44.6; Hogan, supra note 320, at 219.

GILMORE, supra

337. Also relevant to this discussion is the Court's statement: "Sections 9503 and 9504
of the California Commercial Code which provide for such takings, are therefore constitutionally defective and void." 338 F. Supp. at 618. In the context of the facts of. this

case there is no taking under §9504 except that entailed in disposition of the collateral
previously taken from the debtors' possession.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970).
Id. at 1309-10.
See id. at 1311-13.
See id. at 1310-11.
See UCC §9-504 (3) (1962 and 1971 versions).
309 F. Supp. at 1311.

344. Id.
345. See UCC §9-507 (1) (1962 and 1971 versions).
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table extension of Fuentes. Whether the
toward still more strictures on prejudgment
but as all further litigation in this area will
to the effects of that landmark decision
this study.

decision is indicative of a trend
remedies is impossible to ascertain
hinge largely on Fuentes, a return
is essential to the conclusion of

SOME FURTHER CONCLUSIONS

The Court's stated purpose for a prior hearing requirement in Fuentes"to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of property" 346- is a worthy
objective. The creditor whose rights are at stake is not an impartial arbiter
of the dispute 347 and a hearing prior to even temporary deprivation can only
increase respect for our system of justice whether the debtor ultimately prevails with a defense or offers none whatsoever. The goal is not obtained
without costs, however. The adverse effects on the availability and costs
of credit that may result from a curbing of creditors' provisional remedies
has previously been suggested, but it seems only proper to devote some consideration to those arguments that view these byproducts, at least in some
respects, as desirable.
Even the casual student of consumerism is aware that easy credit is often
the vehicle by which the unscrupulous and irresponsible members of the
business community mulct the uneducated and unsophisticated members of
the lower and even middle classes. 34 8 But aside from its use in the more ques-

tionable practices of the marketplace, the availability of credit contributes
to unwise spending habits on the part of many more sophisticated Americans.
Even when the consumer has not subjected himself to the nightmares of overextension, that portion of his income consumed in interest or carrying
charges is simply not available for purchases of other more tangible goods and
services. Furthermore, although consumer credit may contribute to the creation of mass markets and therefore greater productivity, there are those
who contend that the demand for many of the goods produced is not founded
in real consumer needs or wants but is a product through salesmanship and
advertising of the same industrial system that produced the goods.3 49 Finally,
there is some evidence that movements in consumer installment borrowing
3
contribute to the instability of the economy.

0

These arguments may be largely countered, however. The contributions
of consumer credit to cyclical movements of the economy are not substantial
1
and may be controlled by general monetary and credit policy. 3 5 Each indi-

vidual consumer is best able to decide his own allocation of resources in346.
347.
348.

407 U.S. at 97.
See id. at 81.
See, e.g., D. CAPLOVrrZ,

(1965); W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER,
(1968).
349. This has been a theme of many of the writings of Professor Galbraith. See, e.g.,
J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 139-60 (1958).
350. See P. MCCRACKEN, J. MAO & C. FRICKE, CONSUMER INSrALLMFNT CREDIT AND PUBLIC
POLICY 45-72 (1965).
351. See id. at 73-96.
THE POOR PAY MORE

THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE
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cluding the amount of his expenditures for credit for as the Court concluded in rejecting a necessities doctrine in Fuentes: "[U]nder our free enterprise system, an individual's choices in the marketplace are respected, however unwise they may seem to someone else." 3 52 And although the deceptive
practices of those who prey upon the uninformed are often coupled with or
made possible by overextensions of credit, does this abuse by some creditors
require that measure of overkill contained in a restriction of all creditors'
remedies? Increased regulation of offending businesses and consumer education may be both more direct and effective measures to cure these ills.
Professor Kripke suggests that corrective measures be aimed at the specific
abuses for he correlates the majority of defaults not with the overreaching
of creditors but with changed conditions in the debtor's financial picture
such as loss of job or family illness. 353 While these changed economic conditions are often beyond the control of the debtor, they are likewise often
impossible for the creditor to forecast and thus defaults stemming therefrom
are not a result of overextension by creditors. Finally, the restrictions on the
provisional remedies work to the direct benefit of those, who having no
justification or excuse, can and should pay their obligations but refuse to do so.
If a realignment of debtor-creditor law requires that the debtor be protected against unscrupulous creditors, it conversely should require that
creditor and public interests be protected against unscrupulous debtors. Consumerism must advance beyond the quixotic view so often taken by the media
and aspiring politicians that equates any victory of any consumer over a
business interest, regardless of how unfounded and undeserving, with furtherance of the public interest. The importance of credit to our over-all productivity is deserving of more than passing interest.
Humanitarian concern for debtors must always be exercised with a view
to all consequences of the remedial procedure employed. Although the costs
of credit for the purchase of purely consumer goods can only decrease the
over-all purchasing power of the debtor for other goods and services, and
although the poor pay dearly for the privilege, "[a] washing machine, for
example, in the hands of a relief client might become a fruitful source of
income." 354 Then there is overlying the entire issue of availability of credit
the ominous presence of the loan shark who will operate by processes that
are not concerned, euphemistically speaking, with the amenities of due process.
The efforts to trace the evolutive strictures placed on the provisional
remedies through the traditional patterns placed thereon by the states and
the now paramount constitutional limitations of first Sniadach and now
Fuentes, establish that most present law on the subject is not only couched
in terms of some rather arbitrary restraints but is of highly questionable constitutional validity. Yet there remains a constitutionally sanctioned area in
which policy dictates that temporary deprivations before hearing have validity.
352. 407 US. at 90.
353. See Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68
COLum. L. REv. 445, at 478-86.
354. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(dissenting opinion).
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Doubtlessly, legislation will soon be forthcoming that will represent the
best efforts of legislators to implement this policy, which is embodied in the
words of Sniadach as a "statute narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condition." 3

5

The discussion of Fuentes recognized cases of takings necessary to

secure jurisdiction and to protect against the immediate danger of destruction or concealment of the goods as being within the privileged area, but
these instances may be only illustrative and others may well exist particularly
when creditors are proceeding collectively through such representatives as
trustees or receivers. Hopefully, forthcoming legislation will do more. Any
meaningful reassessment of the law in this area should also address itself
to the elimination of unjustifiable restraints on legitimate collection efforts
and certainly this should encompass a reexamination of exemption policies to
insure that while no debtor will be forced to the poverty level, no creditor
will be otherwise frustrated in his collection efforts.
Constitutional censure of traditional practices should produce more than
mere stop-gap measures and will perhaps serve as the catalyst for a comprehensive reexamination of laws that for too long have escaped such scrutiny.
If a state of law of extraordinary complexity contributed to the movement
toward synthesis that culminated in article nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code,3 56 there may be reason to hope that the same stimulus will produce a
similar herculean effort in the other fields of debtor-creditor relations. Certainly while the consumer would be deserving of special consideration in any
comprehensive proposal that developed, the juxtaposition of creditor, debtor,
and public interests demands that the consumer's problems be considered in
relation to the whole. We must do more than pluck some of the offending
titles from the mosaic.
In any even, practitioners and students of this once venerable field of
law can no longer be accused of working in a static area. Although the issues
are complex and consensus as to solutions notably lacking, the future of
debtor-creditor relations will be both eventful and exciting.

355. 395 U.S. at 339.
356. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 521, §9.1.
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LAW, LOVE AND PERCEPTIONS OF REALITY
PMTR WARD*

I

God is, at least, infinite creation; observable, to an extent, in the transmutation of matter and energy; experiencable, to a degree, in sacrificial love.
II
This definition has both a material and non-material aspect combined
in an over-all unity.
III

It is assumed that the material aspect is in continual flux because of (1)
the influence of the forces in its own aspect and (2) the influence of the forces
in the non-material aspect.
It is assumed, also, that the non-material aspect is in continual flux because of the influence of its forces and the forces in the material aspect.
Hence, it is presumed that the unitary aspect of the material and nonmaterial aspects is in continual flux.
IV
Religion utilizes revelation and intuition to describe this unity.
Philosophy utilizes the intellectual processes to describe this unity.
Hence, it is presumed that religion and philosophy will be in continual
flux.
V
Sacrificial love is a means by which this unity can be experienced.
Hence, it is presumed that such experiences will be in continual flux.
VI
Positive law is assumed to be a command operating within the material
aspect.
Hence, it is presumed that positive law is in continual flux.
It is assumed that the material aspect can be described in ways that are
relational to the non-material aspect.
It is assumed that positive law should seek solutions to the intrarelational
problems of the material aspect which are tolerable to the non-material aspect
(the correlary for law in the non-material aspect is apparent but beyond the
ambit of this paper).
It is presumed that legal solutions will be in continual flux.
It is assumed that sacrificial love is a measure of adequacy in such solutions.
*A.B. 1936, Harvard University; LL.B. 1939, Cornell University; Professor of Law, Uni-

versity of Florida
Copyright @ 1972 by Peter Ward.
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